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Complicity by Referral
HEATHER M. FIELD*
ABSTRACT
Providing a legal referral to a prospective client after declining a proffered mat-
ter may seem relatively uncontroversial. Indeed, a lawyer who provides a legal
referral, even for an aspiring law-breaker, would be quite unlikely to be subject to
any professional sanctions or legal liability as a result. Yet, by providing a legal
referral to a potential law-breaker, the lawyer advances the prospective client's
highly questionable goals and becomes complicit in the client's efforts to circum-
vent the law. Thus, this article argues that the decision to offer a legal referral is
much more morally fraught than previously understood. In response, this article
provides guidance about the parameters that should govern a lawyer's decision
about whether and to whom a lawyer should give legal referrals, particularly for
matters where clients seek to achieve questionable (or worse) objectives. As the
first article to examine the most basic referral scenario (i.e., without referral fees
and without any continuing involvement by the referring lawyer), this article fills a
gap in the ethics literature and empowers lawyers to make more morally defensible
decisions when responding to common referral requests.
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INTRODUCTION
The brother-in-law (BIL) of a lawyer's very good client calls the lawyer and
asks for assistance on a new matter. After the initial conversation, the lawyer is
concerned that BIL wants to be very (perhaps overly) aggressive. Exactly how
aggressive is not entirely clear from the consultation conversation, but the lawyer
decides not to get involved with BIL. The lawyer declines the representation, but
when BIL asks for a referral to another lawyer who might assist, the lawyer wants
to be helpful so as to not offend the good client from whom BIL obtained the law-
yer's name. Thus, the lawyer provides BIL with a referral to another lawyer who
is reputed to be more aggressive.
This situation arises across practice areas. A prospective client may want help
pursuing very aggressive tax reduction strategies, perhaps bordering on evasion.1
A prospective client may want help protecting assets from swarming creditors or
1. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorney Sentenced to 15 Years in
Prison for Orchestrating Multibillion Dollar Criminal Tax Fraud Scheme (June 25, 2014), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/former-jenkens-gilchrist-attomey-sentenced-15-years-prison-orchestrating-multibillion-dollar [https://
perma.cc/SYWY-ZLHC] (lawyer convicted for mle in clients' tax shelter activity).
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a soon-to-be-ex-spouse, perhaps approaching fraud.2 A prospective client may
want help skirting regulatory restrictions applicable to its business, perhaps verg-
ing on law-breaking.3 Wherever the law imposes limits, some clients will aspire
to push, or even exceed, those limits.4
The lawyer clearly has discretion to decline to represent a potential tax evader,
a potential fraudster, or other potential law-breaker. But when a lawyer declines
a matter, for an aspiring limit-pusher or otherwise, he6 is almost certain to be
asked for a referral. Lawyers often want to help, so they may want to provide
referrals if they can think of lawyers' names to offer.
Providing a legal referral to a prospective client after declining a matter may
seem uncontroversial. Lawyers regularly provide referrals and, except in limited
circumstances, 7 they rarely think twice about doing so. Indeed, a lawyer who pro-
vides a mere referral, even for a client with extremely aggressive objectives,
would be quite unlikely to be subject to any professional sanctions or legal
liability as a result.8 Yet, this article argues that by providing a legal referral the
lawyer advances the prospective client's highly questionable goals, making
the lawyer complicit in the prospective client's efforts to circumvent the law. The
lawyer bears moral responsibility for making the referral even in the absence of
professional sanctions or legal liability.
Of course, scholars have long recognized the tension between what legal ethics
rules dictate (or allow) and what morality may demand.9 There is extensive
2. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Sheahan, 866 N.W.2d 929 (Minn. 2015) (lawyer suspended
for "assisting his client in the fraudulent transfer of assets during a lawsuit," among other things); State ex rel.
Counsel for Discipline v. Homeber, 708 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 2006) (lawyer suspended for counseling client to
violate property transfer requirement of divorce decree).
3. See, e.g., David Ruiz, Uber's 'Greyball' Program Puts New Focus on Legal Dept., RECORDER (Mar. 3,
2017), https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202780546278/?slreturn=20180012095556 [https://perma.
cc/KQ63-ANJT] (suggesting that lawyers who approved of Uber's plan to use its "greyball" program to evade
regulators could be subject to disbarment).
4. Examples could be drawn from almost any practice area, from securities law and banking law, to employ-
ment law and environmental law, and even to issues such as legal restrictions on torture. See, e.g., W. Bradley
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1167 (2005) (discussing the role of lawyers in
helping clients who want to plan around the law, and considering tax, accounting, and restrictions on torture as
examples) [hereinafter Wendel, Professionalism].
5. See infra Part I.A. The challenges faced by a lawyer who decides to accept the matter for a potential law-
breaker are outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law:
An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper,
Counseling].
6. Where pronouns are used, this article generally refers to client(s) using it/its or they/them/their and to the
lawyer using he/him/his. I generally alternate my articles, with some articles using female pronouns for the law-
yer and others using male pronouns. This article's approach is intended to avoid confusion that could arise if (a)
gender-neutral pronouns were used for both lawyers and clients or (b) if the article alternated between female
and male pronouns for the lawyer. This approach also avoids the awkwardness of "he/she."
7. For example, lawyers must carefully consider referrals if they want a referral fee. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., OW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897); James Barr Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97 (1908); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951);
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literature on whether lawyers should be subject to moral scrutiny for the actions
that the ethical rules allow (or require) them to take on behalf of clients. 0 While
scholars have examined this issue in the context of a lawyer's decision about
whether to accept a new client or matter,1 the literature has not examined the
lawyer's moral responsibility when deciding whether to provide a referral.
Thus, this is the first article to reveal the moral dilemma inherent in a lawyer's
decision about providing a referral, particularly for a prospective client who seeks
aggressive advice. 12 By exploring the tension between a lawyer's moral responsi-
bility and his ethical/legal responsibility for legal referrals, this article empowers
both individual lawyers and the broader legal profession to reassess how to handle
legal referrals, especially for aggressive clients. Ultimately, this article contends
that lawyers, when responding to referral requests, should do more than the mini-
mum that is required to avoid professional sanctions and legal liability.
In response, this article provides guidance about whether and to whom lawyers
should provide legal referrals,13 particularly for clients seeking to achieve question-
able (or worse) objectives. Thus, this article fills a gap in the literature. Rules and
commentary about lawyer referrals address referral fees,14 lawyer referral services
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1 (1975).
10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 1.02-1.04 (4th ed. 2015);
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHICS (D. Luban ed., 1984); Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27
CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978) [hereinafter Freedman, Personal Responsibility]; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976); Richard W.
Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507 (1994);
Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986) [hereinafter Pepper, Amoral]; Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in
Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37
STAN. L. REv. 589 (1985); Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 1529 (1984); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL.
L. REv. 669 (1978); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988)
[hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion]; Wasserstrom, supra note 9; Wendel, Professionalism, supra note 4.
11. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111
(1995) [hereinafter Freedman, Justification]; W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients-The Moral
Autonomy of the Second-to-the-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 977 (2000); W. Bradley Wendel,
Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
987 (2006) [hereinafter Wendel, Client Selection]; David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment:
Should A Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995).
12. A short forthcoming symposium essay examining how United States clients found the Panamanian law
firm at the center of the "Panama Papers" scandal mentions that a lawyer who provides a referral to a potential
offshore tax evader "passes the buck" onto the next lawyer, but that essay does not examine the moral culpabil-
ity of the referring lawyer, nor does it provide a response to the moral dilemma revealed in this article. See
Heather M. Field, Offshoring Tax Ethics: The Panama Papers, Seeking Refuge from Tax, and Tax Lawyer
Referrals, 62 ST. LouIs U. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (invited symposium essay) [hereinafter Field, Panama
Papers].
13. This article only addresses referrals by lawyers to other lawyers (i.e., to individuals who are also gov-
erned by the legal ethics rules). Referrals to non-lawyers are outside the scope of this article.
14. MODEL RULES R. 1.5(e); see, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 474
(2016) (referral fees when the referring lawyer has a conflict of interest); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 475 (2016) (safeguarding of fees subject to referral fee-splitting); Daniel R.
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and agreements," malpractice actions for negligent referral,16 and working with
referred co-counsel.1 7 But the professional guidance and scholarly literature fail to
address the most basic case: in what circumstances should a lawyer provide (or not
provide) a "no strings attached" legal referral (i.e., with no fee-splitting and no con-
tinued involvement). 8 This lack of literature and guidance may suggest that aca-
demics and policymakers assume that once a lawyer decides to decline a matter the
basic referral scenario is unproblematic, such that no guidance is needed. That
assumption is misguided. Given a lawyer's moral responsibility for providing a
referral that furthers a prospective client's questionable goals, lawyers need guid-
ance about how to handle referral requests. This article supplies it.
Specifically, this article argues that the lawyer should not provide a referral if
the subsequent representation would enable the client to violate the law. In all
other cases, this article argues that a lawyer should analyze the referral request
using the lawyer's lawyering philosophy coupled with a risk-based analysis in
which the lawyer assesses the risk of law-breaking or moral repugnancy posed by
the client, the matter, and the referred lawyer. This approach helps the lawyer
make a morally defensible decision about whether to contribute to the continua-
tion of the matter via a referral. However, because of ongoing debates about law-
yers' moral accountability for actions taken in a professional capacity, and out of
respect for lawyers' moral autonomy, among other considerations, this article
argues for voluntary, rather than mandatory, adoption of these recommendations.
Thus, a lawyer's failure to follow this article's guidelines could subject the law-
yer to criticism on moral grounds but should not result in professional sanctions
or other legal liability.
In sum, this article makes two contributions to the literature: it identifies the
act of making a legal referral as much more morally fraught than previously
understood, and it is the first to provide guidance about when lawyers should (or
should not) provide mere legal referrals, particularly for potential law-breakers.
Alexander, Referral Fees and Other Fee Arrangements Between Attorneys in Different States, 27 J. LEG. PROF.
123 (2003); Rachel L. Bosworth, Is the Model Rule Outdated? Texas Carries Referral Fee Responsibility into
the Limited Liability Era, 84 TEX. L. REV. 509 (2005). See generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 9.20.
15. MODEL RULES R. 7.2(b)(2), (b)(4) & cmts. [6]-[S]; see, e.g., ABA MODEL SUPREME COURT RULES
GOVERNING LAWYER REFERRAL & INFORMATION SERVICE (AM. BAR Ass'N 1993); Katherine Huneke &
Nathan Mintz, Note, Lawyer Referral Services and the Model Rules: Balancing Legal Accessibility with
Professional Independence, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 827 (2002); Geeta Kharkar, Note, Googling for Help:
Lawyer Referral Services and the Internet, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 769 (2007). See generally HAZARD, supra
note 10, at § § 60.03, 60.05.
16. See, e.g., Briggs Cheney, It's Not Just About the Referral, DIALOGUE, Summer 2004, at 9; Bruce Ching,
Attorney Referral, Negligence, and Vicarious Liability, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 217 (2009); Barry Temkin, Can
Negligent Referral to Another Attorney Constitute Legal Malpractice?, 17 TOURO L. REV. 639 (2001);
HAZARD, supra note 10, at ch. 5; RONALD E. MALLEN ET AL., LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 5.51 (2016).
17. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 5.1(c)(2); George M. Cohen, The Multilawyered Problems of Professional
Responsibility, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1409, 1428-41 (2003); Douglas R. Richmond, Professional
Responsibilities of Co-Counsel: Joint Venturers or Scorpions in a Bottle?, 98 Ky. L.J. 461 (2010).
18. Cf. Field, Panama Papers, supra note 12.
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This article proceeds as follows: Part I elaborates on the basic referral scenario
facing lawyers, using the example of the potential tax evader seeking legal assis-
tance. Part II analyzes how the professional responsibility and legal liability rules
apply to a lawyer who provides a referral for a potential law-breaker. Part III
examines the moral responsibility of the referring lawyer. Part IV bridges the
gap between the lawyer's professional responsibility and legal liability, on the
one hand, and the lawyer's moral responsibility, on the other hand, by provid-
ing recommendations about how the lawyer should respond to referral
requests, particularly those from potential law-breakers. This is followed by a
conclusion.
I. ELABORATING ON THE BASIC REFERRAL CASE
Referral requests are often more varied and nuanced than the introductory
example. Thus, this section elaborates on the range of referral scenarios as back-
ground for this article's discussion of a lawyer's responses thereto.
Note that this article focuses on the prospective advising context, in which
an individual seeks a lawyer's assistance in doing something in the future
that may be illegal or immoral. The retrospective context, in which the client
has already engaged in an arguably illegal activity and needs a lawyer to
assist in the client's defense, is different and is outside the scope of this
article. 19
A. DECLINING A NEW MATTER/CLIENT OR WITHDRAWING FROM AN
ONGOING MATTER
Requests for lawyer referrals likely arise in two situations: (a) where the
lawyer declines to accept a new client or a new matter for an existing client, or
(b) where the lawyer withdraws from an ongoing matter for an existing client.
In either situation, the prospective/existing client likely wants to continue to
pursue its goals and may ask the declining/withdrawing lawyer for a referral to
another lawyer.
1. MANDATORY Vs. DISCRETIONARY DECLINATION/WITHDRAWAL
A declination or withdrawal may be either mandatory or discretionary under
the Model Rules.
A lawyer must decline or withdraw if "the representation will result in viola-
tion of the rules of professional conduct or other law." 20 This is a high
standard,21 and this rule does not require declination or withdrawal if the (pro-
spective) client is merely an aspiring limit-pusher and thus a potential law-
19. HAZARD, supra note 10, at §§ 1.02-1.04 (distinguishing between "helping a person commit an offense
and defending a person charged with a completed offence").
20. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.16(a)(1).
21. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 21.08 (noting the use of "will" rather than "is likely to").
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breaker (or even an aspiring law-breaker) because the lawyer would, during
the representation, have the opportunity to persuade the client to take a lawful
approach.2 2 The rule only mandates declination or withdrawal if and when the
lawyer knows23 that the representation will result in a violation of the law.
In other circumstances, a lawyer has discretion to withdraw or decline. For an exist-
ing client, a lawyer may withdraw from an existing representation for several reasons,
including if "withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client," if "the client persists in a course of action involving the law-
yer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent," or if "the
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement."24 Similar concerns may also lead a lawyer
to decline a proffered matter for a prospective client (or to decline a new matter for a
current client outside the scope of an existing representation). For prospective clients
and new matters, however, the lawyer has even broader discretion because he is not
legally or ethically obligated to accept any given representation except pursuant to a
court appointment.25 For example, a lawyer may decline a new matter for a reason as
simple as not having enough time. Similarly, lawyers regularly decline and want to
offer a referral when a prospective matter is outside the lawyer's area of expertise.2 6
Thus, a lawyer may exercise discretion to decline or, to a lesser degree, withdraw2 7
from a matter in various situations, including (a) where a client wants to pursue legally
questionable goals, to which the lawyer may or may not also have moral objections,
and (b) where a client wants to pursue a matter that is highly likely to comply with the
law but which the lawyer finds morally objectionable.
2. UNDERSTANDING THE LAWYER's DECISION
A lawyer's decision to decline or withdraw depends on factors that include
what he knows about the matter and the client's objectives, at what point a matter
becomes too aggressive for the particular lawyer, and how he prioritizes among
legal, business, and moral risks.
22. MODEL RULES R. 1.16, cmt. [2].
23. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 1.24 (discussing what it means for a lawyer to "know" something); see also
Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 196-202 (2011).
24. MODEL RULES R. 1.16(b)(1)-(b)(2), (b)(4).
25. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 1.04, n. 11.
26. MODEL RULES R. 1.16, cmt. [1] ("A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be
performed competently."); MODEL RULES R. 1.1 & cmt. [1] (providing that competence, for purposes of under-
taking a legal representation, includes being able to employ the "requisite knowledge and skill in a particular
matter" (i.e., expertise)).
27. In addition, discretionary withdrawal can present ethical complications because of the existing lawyer-
client relationship. Thus, when discussing withdrawal, this article assumes that (a) the lawyer fully discussed
with the client the lawyer's concerns and tried to persuade the client to follow the lawyer's recommendations,
and (b) the lawyer appropriately mitigated harm to the client upon withdrawal. MODEL RULES R. 1.16(d);
HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 21.18.
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A lawyer likely knows a lot about the matter's details and the client's goals
when he withdraws from an ongoing matter. Even in ongoing representations,
however, "it is often difficult to know when clients actually have an illicit pur-
pose." 28 Nevertheless, if withdrawing, the lawyer likely had confidential conver-
sations with the client about the matter and gained at least some meaningful
insights into the client's objectives and the lawyer's ability to influence the cli-
ent's behavior. These insights enable the lawyer to know whether mandatory
withdrawal is required or whether discretionary withdrawal is allowed.
Where a lawyer considers declining a prospective matter or client, the lawyer
often has less information on which to base this decision. This is partly because
the lawyer may try not to receive confidential information before deciding
whether to accept the representation 29 and because information is often revealed
to the lawyer only during the course of working with the client. Also, clients
rarely come to lawyers with well-formulated plans about how to achieve a partic-
ular goal. Rather, they sometimes articulate objectives for the representation-
perhaps some goal they "heard from a friend or colleague" that they could
achieve-and hope that the lawyer will provide the particular legal mechanics for
achieving those objectives. Furthermore, prospective clients may be reluctant to
reveal their true motives (particularly if they are extremely aggressive) during an
intake conversation.
Consider an example in the tax context in which a taxpayer may approach a
tax lawyer for assistance moving assets offshore to reduce United States tax
liability, perhaps as the taxpayer heard that others have done. The taxpayer is
unlikely to offer a concrete plan. Thus, it is often difficult for a lawyer to know
based on an intake conversation whether the client seeks planning assistance that
is clearly within the boundaries of the law (e.g., ensuring that future distributions
from a foreign corporate subsidiary to its United States corporate parent will ben-
efit from the 100 percent participation exemption under new I.R.C. section
245A); 0 whether the client seeks planning assistance that pushes the limits of the
law (e.g., efforts by a multi-national corporation with foreign subsidiaries and a
taxable year other than the calendar year to reduce the 2018 cash position of the
foreign subsidiaries in order to minimize the impact of new I.R.C. section 965's
deemed repatriation tax in a way that could be abusive);31 or whether the client
seeks planning assistance that clearly enables law-breaking (e.g., moving assets
28. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 6.02.
29. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.18 & cmt. [4].
30. See I.R.C. § 245A (2018).
31. See generally Stephen E. Shay, Treasury Can Close a Potential Loophole in the Treatment of Deferred
Foreign Income in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act - Will It Act? (Dec. 26, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=3093379 [https://perma.cc/F2M5-MGZR] (discussing such strategies and the
possibility that the Treasury could curtail them by promulgating anti-avoidance regulations as authorized under
I.R.C. section 965(c)(3)(F)).
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offshore after which an individual U.S. taxpayer will illegally refuse to report or
pay U.S. taxes on earnings on those assets).32
Nevertheless, the intake conversation likely provides the lawyer with some in-
formation about the matter and the prospective client's desired approach. The
lawyer also likely obtains some insight into whether the prospective client is an
aspiring limit-pusher. Some aspiring limit-pushers may be willing to break the
law if it serves their business goals, and some clients may be more aggressive,
actually aspiring to break the law and not get caught. Of course, given the law-
yer's incomplete knowledge of the facts, limited insight into the client's objec-
tives and intent, and the frequent indeterminacy of the law,33 the lawyer often
must decide whether to commit himself to a client without knowing quite how
aggressive the client and matter will be.
Each lawyer has his own standards for determining at what level of legal uncer-
tainty a legally questionable matter becomes "too aggressive," thus triggering his
declination or withdrawal. Of course, some matters must be declined because
they would "result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law."34 But among matters that the lawyer has discretion to decline, lawyers take
different approaches. Returning to the tax example, one tax lawyer might decline
as "too aggressive" matters that likely involve mere tax avoidance, but on which
he is unlikely to be able to opine at a "more likely than not" or higher level.3 5 He
may be disinclined to assist with even somewhat aggressive matters, and he may
focus his practice on clients whose primary goal is compliance. Another tax law-
yer might have no objection to assisting on matters that are somewhat more
aggressive (e.g., that have only "substantial authority" or "reasonable basis")36
and might, instead, only decline matters where the client has a law-breaking (and
not merely limit-pushing) intent. That lawyer might conclude that, even if the
lawyer could nudge an aspiring tax-evader toward behavior that is compliant
32. See generally JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶¶ B1.03, B31.08,
C2.10 (2017) (discussing tax payment and reporting obligations of individual United States taxpayers with for-
eign earnings).
33. See Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 624 (acknowledging the challenges of legal realism, which means
that the law is not always "objectively out there to be discovered and applied").
34. MODEL RULES R. 1.16(a)(1); see also supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
35. Tax advisors are regularly asked to opine on the likelihood that a particular position will succeed on the
merits if challenged. Thus, tax lawyers often discuss matters with reference to the level of confidence with
which they could opine on them. Opinion levels are terms-of-art in tax law, including "will" (more than ninety-
five percent chance of success on the merits), "should" (approximately seventy to seventy-five percent), "more
likely than not" (more than fifty percent), "substantial authority" (approximately thirty-five to forty percent),
and "reasonable basis" (approximately twenty to thirty percent). See, e.g., Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion
Practice, 64 TAx LAW. 301, 327 (2011). The exact numerical translations vary slightly, but the opinion levels
have important implications for taxpayers and their advisers. For example, both taxpayers and their advisers
can avoid common penalties for non-shelter transactions if (a) there was "substantial authority" or (b) there was
"reasonable basis" and the position was disclosed. See I.R.C. §§ 6664(c), 6694. See generally Heather M.
Field, Aggressive Tax Planning and the Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA. TAx REv. 261, 270-74 (2017) (discussing
tax opinion levels and their consequences in more detail) [hereinafter Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer].
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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enough to avoid mandatory declination or withdrawal, clients that he must influ-
ence in that way are too aggressive for him. Other lawyers may not impose such
limitations on the types of clients they will represent, and these lawyers would
likely be willing to assist with all matters unless and until the rules mandate decli-
nation or withdrawal.
Even if lawyers draw the line at the same level of aggressiveness, they may
make that decision for different reasons. A lawyer's decision to decline may be
driven by concerns about his own legal or business risks, including risk of profes-
sional sanctions or penalties; risk that he might want to (or be required to) with-
draw from the matter in the future, which can be complicated and uncomfortable;
or risk of adverse reputational consequences for handling such legally question-
able matters. Or his decision to decline or withdraw could be driven by moral
qualms about assisting with such a legally questionable matter. For example, a
lawyer may conclude that he does not want to represent a client that seeks to pur-
sue a very aggressive (and legally questionable, but not clearly fraudulent) inver-
sion because of (a) the increased risk of professional sanctions, penalties, or
possible reputational impacts he could face for advising on aggressive matters, or
(b) his moral opposition to any aggressive tax reduction efforts. Either (or both)
of these very different reasons/concerns may lead a lawyer to decline a legally
questionable matter.
In addition, a lawyer may decline or withdraw from matters that are not legally
questionable. He may object to a matter on purely moral grounds even if the mat-
ter is legally certain. For example, a tax lawyer who considers all inversions and
other efforts to shift profits offshore to be "unpatriotic"3 7 and "immoral"38 would
decline to assist with any offshoring strategies, even if they clearly complied with
the law.39
B. PROVIDING THE REFERRAL
Regardless of whether a lawyer declines or withdraws, whether that decision is
discretionary or mandatory, whether the lawyer really knows the client's intent,
and whether the lawyer is motivated by legal, moral, or other concerns, a lawyer
will often want to provide a referral for the party seeking assistance. This may be
purely out of a desire to be helpful. Often, however, lawyers want to provide
referrals for other reasons, including (a) loyalty to another client (as in the case of
BIL, where the lawyer wanted to keep his good client happy), (b) a desire to gen-
erate goodwill among, and possibly referrals from, other lawyers, and (c) the pos-
sibility of earning referral fees.
37. Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Closing Corporate Tax Loopholes, The White House (July 26, 2014)
(discussing inversions).
38. Press Briefing Memo, Senate Finance Committee, Grassley Announces Bill to Rein in Corporate
Expatriation (Apr. 11, 2002).
39. See Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer, supra note 35, at 287 (describing how a moralist lawyer would assist
with various offshoring techniques).
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If a lawyer decides to provide a referral, the referral may or may not come with
"strings." Specifically, the lawyer may completely cease to be involved in the
matter or the lawyer may remain involved, serving as an intermediary between
the client and the referred lawyer, serving as co-counsel with the referred lawyer,
or otherwise.4 0 Additionally, the referring lawyer may or may not earn a referral
fee, which is allowed under the Model Rules if, among other requirements, "the
division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the presentation."4 1 The most basic case, which is
the focus of this article, is the "mere referral" with no strings attached-where
the lawyer provides a referral to another lawyer, ceases any further involvement
in the matter, and does not receive any referral fee.
II. THE REFERRER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL
LIABILITY
For a lawyer who wants to, or is required to, decline a matter because it is "too
aggressive" and who wants to provide a "mere referral" (i.e., no referral fees and
no continued involvement), what rules govern his behavior? This section dis-
cusses the referring lawyer's responsibilities under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, exposure to possible criminal charges, and exposure to
malpractice liability when providing a legal referral to a potential law-breaker.
Additional subject-specific professional responsibility and legal liability rules
might apply to a referring lawyer depending on the relevant field of law. As an
example, this section also discusses the tax-specific rules relevant for a lawyer
providing a referral to a potential tax evader.
As illustrated below, these rules provide very few requirements or constraints
on the lawyer who provides a potential law-breaker with a referral to another
lawyer.
A. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Although the Model Rules42 explicitly address referral fees,43 they do not
directly address the basic "no strings attached" legal referral, either in general or
for aspiring limit-pushers and potential law-breakers.
40. See Stephen C. Sieberson, Two Lawyers, One Client, and the Duty to Communicate: A Gap in Rules 1.2
and 1.4, 11 U. N.H. L. REv. 27, 29-32 (2013) (describing different multi-lawyer models).
41. MODEL RuLES R. 1.5(e)(1).
42. All United States lawyers are bound by the professional ethics rules adopted by the lawyer's practice ju-
risdiction. Almost all jurisdictions use some variant of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See HAZARD,
supra note 10, at § 1.15, App. B. Thus, to speak generally about lawyers' obligations, this article refers to the
Model Rules when analyzing a referrer's ethical obligations. Each lawyer should, however, analyze his obliga-
tions under the version of the ethical rules applicable in his jurisdiction.
43. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. One comment to the rule about fee-splitting with referrers states
that "[a] lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent
to handle the matter." MODEL RULES R. 1.5, cmt. 7. This is wise regardless of whether there is fee-splitting. See
Wendy Wen Yun Chang, MustlReally Turn Down That Referral Fee?, 28 GP SOLO 5 (July/Aug. 2011).
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Other than the rules regarding mandatory and discretionary withdrawal or
declination discussed above, the Model Rule most relevant when dealing with
aggressive clients or prospective clients is Model Rule 1.2(d), which states that
a lawyer "shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." This rule, together with Model
Rule 1.16 regarding mandatory withdrawal/declination, clearly precludes the
lawyer from representing a potential law-breaker in a known violation of the
law.44 However, the Model Rules, the case law, and the related commentary do
not directly address whether a lawyer violates Model Rule 1.2(d) (or any other
rule) by providing a referral for a potential law-breaker.
Given the language of the rule, the referral will violate Model Rule 1.2(d) if
(a) the lawyer knows the client's conduct is criminal or fraudulent,45 and (b)
the referral constitutes prohibited "assistance" within the meaning of the
rule.46 Thus, if the lawyer reasonably believes that the client's proposal is mere
law avoidance (and not criminal or fraudulent), the lawyer would clearly not
violate the rule by providing a referral. This is true regardless of whether a
referral constitutes "assistance." On the other hand, if the lawyer knows 4 7 that
the client's proposed conduct certainly (or likely) constitutes fraud or evasion,
it is critical to determine whether providing a referral constitutes prohibited
"assistance."
What constitutes prohibited "assistance" is not entirely clear. Comment 9 to
Model Rule 1.2 explains that there is a "critical distinction between presenting an
analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means
by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity." 48 It is only the lat-
ter that is problematic under Model Rule 1.2(d). Professor Joel Newman explains
that a lawyer may answer client questions about possible conduct as long as the
lawyer does not suggest, direct, encourage, or actively help a client take illegal
action.4 9 Professor Geoffrey Hazard explains that a key issue is the "causal prox-
imity between the lawyer's conduct and the client's illegal purpose," focusing on
"active assistance," and he explains that a lawyer who "perform[s] an act that
44. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAlyn L. REv. 669 (1981); Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH.
L. REV. 287 (1994); Pepper, Counseling, supra note 5.
45. HAZARD, supra note 10, at 1-76, n. 78.
46. It seems reasonably clear that provision of a referral, without more, is not "counsel[ing] a client to
engage in [tax evasion]." MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d). Thus, the discussion focuses on whether a referral consti-
tutes "assistance." Id. (prohibiting the lawyer from "assist[ing] a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent"). However, when providing a referral, the lawyer should not affirmatively counsel or
encourage the client to pursue the potentially illegal matter. See id.; MODEL RULES R. 1.4(a)(5); see also
HAZARD, supra note 10, at §§ 6.34, 8.08.
47. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 1.24 (discussing what it means for a lawyer to "know" something); see also
Roiphe, supra note 23, at 196-20.
48. MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt [9].
49. Newman, supra note 44, at 289-303 (citing cases).
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substantially furthers the [client's illegal] course of conduct" could violate the
rule.o
Under a broad colloquial interpretation, a mere legal referral could be
"assistance" because the referral helps the client to find the referred lawyer,
thereby advancing the client's (possibly) illegal ends. It is much more
likely, however, that a referral does not constitute prohibited assistance
within the meaning of Model Rule 1.2(d) because "assistance," for purposes
of the rule, generally contemplates a context where the lawyer represents
the client," as opposed to the mere referral context, where the lawyer
declines to represent the client.5 2 Providing a referral is, at most, akin to
indirect or passive assistance or the provision of information that the client
cannot, without direct or active assistance from the referred lawyer, "read-
ily ... put to illicit use."5 3 Even armed with a referral, it is uncertain
whether the client will actually engage in its (possibly) desired illegal con-
duct,54 making a mere referral unlikely to be active assistance that violates
the rule. Further, even if the referring lawyer knows that the referred lawyer
regularly assists clients with very aggressive planning, providing a referral
remains a step removed from the advice that directly enables the client's
illegal goals. This is particularly true if the referring lawyer cautions
against pursuing the client's goals when providing the referral and warns
the client that no lawyer can assist with illegal conduct; the referring lawyer
should provide this warning if the client's aims are clearly illegal.
Moreover, the less confident the referring lawyer is that the referred lawyer
will assist with the client's illicit goals, the harder it is to argue that the re-
ferring lawyer is encouraging, actively helping in, or substantially further-
ing the client's achievement of those goals.
The cases most closely analogous to the potential tax evader (or other
potential law-breaker) referral scenario are the old "migratory divorce" cases
in which a lawyer helped a client find an out-of-state lawyer to assist the cli-
ent in obtaining an out-of-state divorce, knowing that the client was not a
50. Hazard, supra note 44, at 671-72, 683; see also HAZARD, supra note 10, at §§ 6.22, 10.39.
51. For example, the Restatement also focuses on active assistance, defining the concept of "assisting" a cli-
ent to include "providing, with a similar intent, other professional services, such as preparing documents, draft-
ing correspondence, negotiating with a nonclient, or contacting a governmental agency." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 94, cmt a.
52. This is likely so even under the relatively broad interpretation of "assistance" reflected in ABA formal
opinions. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Resp. Form. Op. 93-376 ("[C]ontinued participation by the
lawyer in the matter without rectification or disclosure would assist the client in committing a crime or fraud.");
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Resp. Form. Op. 87-353 ("[Tlhe language 'assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by the client' [within the meaning of Model Rule 3.3(a)(2), which uses language similar to Model Rule 1.2
(d)] is not limited to the criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting or subordination.").
53. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 6.25.
54. See infra Part I.A. (describing the causal link between the referral and the prospective client's (possi-
ble) illegal conduct).
55. MODEL RULES R. 1.4(a)(5). See generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at §§ 6.34, 8.08.
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resident of that out-of-state jurisdiction.5 6 These cases support the conclusion
that, even if a lawyer knows that a client wants to use another lawyer's assis-
tance to violate the law, the lawyer who merely makes a referral to a reputa-
ble lawyer should not be disciplined for an ethical violation. This conclusion,
however, may be limited to the "no strings attached" scenario in which the re-
ferring lawyer does not serve as an intermediary for the client (i.e., the refer-
ring lawyer does not directly engage the referred lawyer for the client or
otherwise involve himself with fees paid to the referred lawyer), and in which
the referring lawyer's involvement ceases after he provides the client with
the referred attorney's information57 (i.e., where the client is left to engage
the referred lawyer if and when the client chooses).
Together, this suggests that it is highly unlikely that a lawyer will violate
Model Rule 1.2(d) by providing a potential law-breaker with a mere referral
to another lawyer." Moreover, as long as the referring lawyer only provides a
referral and neither accepts a referral fee nor creates a co-counsel/supervisory
relationship with the referred lawyer, the referring lawyer should not be sub-
ject to other Model Rules that could hold the referring lawyer responsible for
the referred lawyer's compliance with the ethical rules.5 9
B. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY OR AIDING AND ABETTING CHARGES
A lawyer who provides a referral to a potential law-breaker could be, but is
quite unlikely to be, liable under criminal law for aiding and abetting, or for con-
spiracy to commit, the potential law-breaker's underlying criminal behavior-
assuming the behavior turns out to be criminal.60
In the example of the potential tax evader, the underlying criminal behav-
ior would likely be tax fraud under Section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code.6 1 Thus, the referring lawyer could be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2 for
aiding and abetting the underlying taxpayer's tax fraud under Section 7206
56. See, e.g., In re Feltman, 237 A.2d 473 (N.J. 1968) (New Jersey lawyer providing a referral to an
Alabama lawyer for a non-Alabama resident seeking an Alabama divorce); In re Anonymous, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75
(N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (New York lawyer engaging a Mexican attorney for a New York client seeking a
Mexican mail-order divorce). See generally Newman, supra note 44, at 305-08 (discussing the migratory
divorce cases).
57. But see Newman, supra note 44, at 308 (questioning whether the referring lawyer really "needs to wash
one's hands of the matter as thoroughly as was suggested").
58. It is, however, not impossible to violate Model Rule 1.2(d) when providing a mere referral if, for exam-
ple, when providing the referral, the lawyer strongly encourages the potential law-breaker to pursue a course of
action that the lawyer knows is illegal and the lawyer provides the name of a lawyer who he knows regularly
helps clients break the law. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d).
59. MODEL RULES R. 1.5(e), cmt. 5.1; see also Richmond, supra note 17, at 505-14 (discussing the addi-
tional ethical obligations of referring counsel that would arise if any of these additional things are part of the re-
ferring or referred lawyer relationship).
60. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327 (1998)
(discussing the application of the criminal law to lawyers).
61. See I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1982) (making it a felony to willfully submit a false or fraudulent return).
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(1). However, this charge would be quite unlikely to succeed because the
prosecution would have to prove "willfulness" on the part of the tax lawyer.
This is required because in order to sustain an aiding and abetting charge, the
"accomplice must have the same criminal intent" as is required for the under-
lying offense,6 2 and because tax fraud requires "willfulness" by the underly-
ing taxpayer.6
It would be quite difficult to prove that a tax lawyer who declined a matter and
provided a mere referral, even to a potential (or very determined) tax evader, "will-
fully" aided and abetted the underlying tax fraud because willfulness requires "a vol-
untary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."' This willfulness standard
"imposes a heavy burden on the prosecution."65 This burden would be difficult to
meet if a lawyer explicitly declines to represent a potential tax evader and merely
refers that individual to another lawyer who might (or might not) assist, among other
reasons, because there is no legal duty to withhold referrals or otherwise to thwart a
client's ability to get advice on even very aggressive tax planning.66 Moreover, will-
fulness is quite likely lacking in referral cases where the taxpayer's desired tax strat-
egy is only of questionable legality rather than certain illegality.6 7
In addition, the 18 U.S.C. § 2 aiding and abetting charge against a referring lawyer
requires that the government present evidence that the underlying taxpayer evaded tax
under Section 7206(1);68 this imposes an additional burden on the prosecution, making
the aiding and abetting charge against a referring lawyer difficult to mount.
The referring lawyer could also be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspir-
acy to commit Section 7206(1) tax evasion or to defraud the United States.6 9 This
charge is also quite unlikely to succeed. For a conspiracy offense, "the mens rea
62. See MICHAEL SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ¶ 12.05[10][b] (citing cases
and explaining that accomplice liability under 18. U.S.C. § 2 requires that an "accomplice must have the same
criminal intent" as is required for the underlying offense and thus a "defendant must have the willfulness
requirement to aid and abet the tax crimes requiring willfulness"); Department of Justice, 2012 Criminal
Tax Manual § 21.03[2], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2015/03/26/CTM%20TOC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUT4-4LG8] (requiring the "government [to] show that (1) the perpetrator had the requisite
criminal intent to commit the underlying offense and (2) the aider and abettor had the same requisite intent")
[hereinafter DOJ].
63. I.R.C. § 7206(1).
64. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 10 (1976);
United States v. Hirschfeld, 964 F.2d 318, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying the same concept "willfulness" for
tax advisor crimes as for taxpayer crimes), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1087 (1993); see also SALTZMAN & BOOK, Su-
pra note 62, at ¶ 12.02[4]; DOJ, supra note 62, at ¶ 13.07.
65. See Michelle M. Kwon, The Criminality of "Tax Planning", 18 FLA. TAX REV. 153, 163-71 (2015) (dis-
cussing the willfulness standard in criminal tax cases).
66. Further, the lawyer might intend to hinder the achievement of the illicit goals, for example, by providing
a referral to a relatively conservative lawyer, hoping that the latter will curtail the potential law-breaker's
behavior.
67. BORIS BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 50.08[2] (willfulness excludes
"the taxpayer's resolution of debatable legal issues in his own favor").
68. DOJ, supra note 62, at §§ 21.03[1], 21.05[1].
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; I.R.C. § 7206(1).
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required is that the conspirator know that he is agreeing to undertake joint action"
to achieve an illegal goal.70 A lawyer who declines a matter, merely offers a refer-
ral to another lawyer who might handle the matter, and otherwise leaves the tax-
payer to pursue the taxpayer's tax matters as the taxpayer deems appropriate,
could hardly be said to be agreeing with the taxpayer to take joint action, even if
the taxpayer has an illegal tax evasion goal.
Thus, the threat of these criminal charges imposes virtually no constraint on a
lawyer who declines a matter and provides a potential tax evader with a referral
to another lawyer, although it is possible that the analysis could be different out-
side the tax area if the criminal charges underlying the conspiracy or aiding and
abetting charges had different elements.
C. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
In limited circumstances, a referring lawyer could also be subject to a mal-
practice claim for negligent referral.71 This could arise if the lawyer refers the
prospective client to another lawyer who is then negligent when advising the
client. Different jurisdictions in the United States take different approaches to
this claim, with some not recognizing the cause of action, some recognizing
the cause of action only if there is fee-splitting, and others allowing the cause
of action slightly more broadly.7 2 Even in more permissive jurisdictions, the re-
ferring lawyer is unlikely to be liable if the referring lawyer made a mere refer-
ral (i.e., where there is no fee-splitting 73 or other conflicts of interest, 74 and
where the referring lawyer ceases involvement and does not make any repre-
sentations about monitoring or supervising the other lawyer's work75 ), and if
the referring lawyer engaged in at least a minimal investigation of the referred
lawyer's credentials.7 6
The risk for the referring lawyer may be even lower in the aspiring limit-pusher
scenario, particularly when the claim against the referring lawyer is based on vi-
carious liability for the referred lawyer's malpractice (i.e., as opposed to direct
negligence in giving the referral).7 7 Consider a client-driven situation where a
potential tax-evader sought, and the referred lawyer assisted in obtaining, tax ben-
efits that were successfully contested by the IRS or that were determined to consti-
tute tax fraud or evasion. If the referred lawyer was candid with the taxpayer about
the risks and the taxpayer chose to pursue the aggressive strategy anyway, it is not
70. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 62, at ¶ 12.03[1]; see STEVEN R. TOSCHER ET AL., 636-3d TAX CRIMES
I.B.1.; Erin M. Collins & Edward M. Robbins, Jr., Civil & Criminal Tax Fraud, in INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 13:2.5[A] (2016); DOJ, supra note 62, at § 23.04[1].
71. See generally Temkin, supra note 16; MALLEN, supra note 16, at § 5.51.
72. See Ching, supra note 16, at 223-33.
73. Id. at 227-29; Temkin, supra note 16, at 663-76.
74. Ching, supra note 16, at 237-3 8.
75. Id. at 230-32; Temkin, supra note 16, at 655-62.
76. Temkin, supra note 16, at 653-55.
77. See Ching, supra note 16, at 223.
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clear that the referred lawyer's actions constituted a breach of duty78 or were the
proximate cause of the harm suffered by the taxpayer. 7 9 That is, it may be the cli-
ent-an aspiring tax law limit-pusher-rather than either the referred lawyer or
the referring lawyer, that is at fault.
Thus, although a referring attorney could have exposure for negligent
referral, the chances of success of such a claim are likely quite low assuming
a mere referral and assuming the referring lawyer confirmed that the referred
lawyer was admitted to practice and in good standing in the relevant jurisdic-
tion. As a result, this possible, but low, malpractice exposure is unlikely to
impose a meaningful restriction on a lawyer's decision about whether to pro-
vide a referral to a potential law-breaker.
D. SUBJECT-AREA SPECIFIC RULES
In some areas of law, subject-area specific conduct rules also apply to con-
strain the behavior of lawyers. 0 In tax, for example, the key subject-specific
constraints on a lawyer's behavior come from Circular 230, which articulates
the standards of practice applicable to tax professionals who practice before
the IRS, and from the penalty provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Each
will be discussed briefly to illustrate the relevance of subject-area specific rules
to a lawyer's decision about whether to provide a legal referral for an aspiring
limit-pusher. As discussed further below, a tax lawyer who provides a mere
referral to a potential tax evader is unlikely to be subject to sanctions under
Circular 230 or penalties under the IRC.
Lawyers in other practice areas should perform similar analyses under the sub-
ject-area specific professional conduct rules relevant in their fields.
78. Failure of a strategy to be sustained on the merits does not mean that the advice given was negligent. For
example, if a lawyer opines that a position is supported by substantial authority (but not more) and the position
is successfully challenged by the tax authority, it is still entirely possible that the lawyer discharged his respon-
sibilities consistently with the standard of care. See generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 5.03.
79. See generally Jacob L. Todres, Bad Tax Shelters-Accountability or the Lack Thereof: Ten Years of Tax
Malpractice, 66 BAYLOR L. REv. 602, 608-12 (2014) (discussing the requirements for tax malpractice claims);
see also Hassebrock v. Bernhoft, No. 10-CV-679-JPG-DGW, 2014 WL 1758884 (S.D. Ill. May 2,2014) (denying
client's legal malpractice claim against attorney when client had been convicted of tax evasion with respect to the
matter); see generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at § § 5.25, 5.26; MALLEN, supra note 16, at § § 22:1, 22:10.
80. Subject-area specific conduct rules arise in various practice areas. For example, the SEC prescribed
standards of professional conduct for lawyers practicing before the SEC. Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8185; 34-47276, (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm [https://perma.cc/X2KX-WAQN];
see generally Robert B. Robbins, Ethics and Professional Responsibility for Attorneys in Securities
Transactions, SU41 ALI-CLE 495 (2013); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 ViLL. L. REV. 867
(2004). Bankruptcy lawyers are also subject to bankruptcy-specific rules regarding their professional conduct.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-57 (bankruptcy crimes); 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4) (regarding the meaning of attorney
signatures in bankruptcy matters). Other areas have subject specific rules as well. See, e.g., Daniel Riesel &
Victoria Shiah, Ethical Considerations for the Clean Air Act Attorney, SR033 ALI-ABA 305 (2009)
(discussing ethics/conduct rules for environmental lawyers).
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1. CIRCuLAR 230
Like the generally applicable ethics rules, Circular 2301 does not explic-
itly address referrals. The portion of Circular 230 most relevant to the
potential tax evader referral situation provides that a tax professional can be
sanctioned if he is "incompetent or disreputable." 8 2 "Incompetence and dis-
reputable conduct" include "willfully assisting, counseling, encouraging a
client or prospective client in violating, or suggesting to a client or prospec-
tive client to violate, any Federal tax law, or knowingly counseling or sug-
gesting to a client or prospective client an illegal plan to evade Federal
taxes or payment thereof."8 3 Thus, whether a referring lawyer is subject to
sanctions under this part of Circular 230 for providing a referral to a poten-
tial tax evader depends on (a) whether making a referral is the type of action
covered by the rule and (b) whether the referring attorney behaves with the
requisite intent.
As to types of actions covered by the rule, providing a referral, even to a poten-
tial tax evader, is unlikely to constitute "assisting" or "counseling" the client in
violating the law, as was discussed above with respect to the analysis under the
Model Rules.8 4 Circular 230 also prohibits the additional actions of "suggesting"
and "encouraging" the violation of the tax law, but providing a referral is still
unlikely to be sanctionable under Circular 230 if the lawyer merely responds to a
client's referral request (i.e., rather than affirmatively "suggesting" that the client
should consider hiring a particular lawyer to assist the client in illegally reducing
its tax burden) and if the lawyer does not "encourage" violation of the tax law
when providing the referral." The prohibition on "encouraging" does suggest,
however, that the lawyer should affirmatively discourage potential tax evaders to
decrease the risk that the mere provision of the referral could be construed as
implicit encouragement. 8 6
On the question of intent, a lawyer must act "willfully" (when assisting, coun-
seling, or encouraging a client with violating the law) or "knowingly" (when
counseling or suggesting an illegal plan to evade taxes) for his actions to be sanc-
tionable under the portion of Circular 230 cited above. As explained above, "will-
fulness" would be quite hard to establish if a lawyer declines a representation
because of the lack of "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty." 8 7 In addition, "knowing" behavior requires that the lawyer must "know"
81. 31 C.F.R. § 10.
82. Id. at § 10.50(a).
83. Id. at § 10.51(a)(7).
84. See supra Part II.A.
85. Circular 230 is more explicit than Model Rule 1.2(d) about "suggesting" and "encouraging." Model
Rule 1.2(d) does not explicitly prohibit such actions, but encouragement is inadvisable even under the less
explicit language of Model Rule 1.2(d). See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
86. This is consistent with Model Rule 1.4(a)(5). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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the plan is "illegal" and "know" it will evade federal tax." Establishing that a re-
ferring lawyer "knew" either of these things is difficult if the referring lawyer
declines to advise directly on the matter and only provides a referral to some-
one who might advise on the matter; there is greater risk that the lawyer
"knows" if he has been representing the client and then withdraws. Further,
the knowingly standard only applies to "counseling or suggesting ... an ille-
gal plan to evade" taxes; this standard does not apply to "assisting" or
"encouraging," which are the actions most likely to be implicated by some-
one who is providing a referral. Thus, even if the lawyer "knows" that the cli-
ent's desired plan is (likely) illegal, merely providing a referral seems
unlikely to violate this part of Circular 230 if he does not suggest the plan or
counsel the client about the plan.
It is important to note, however, that Circular 230's definition of "incom-
petent or disreputable conduct" is inclusive and not exclusive.8 9 Thus, the
fact that a mere referral is unlikely to constitute any of the listed types of
misconduct does not preclude the Office of Professional Responsibility
from arguing that providing a referral for a potential tax evader is sanction-
able under Circular 230 as "incompetent or disreputable conduct" particu-
larly if the referring lawyer knows that the client intended to illegally evade
tax. Such an approach would, however, depart from current practice.
2. I.R.C. TAX PENALTIES
The Internal Revenue Code also contains penalty provisions that apply to tax
advisers. The penalty provisions most likely to apply to a lawyer who provides a
referral to a potential tax evader are the civil and criminal penalties for aiding and
abetting taxpayers in understatements or fraud or evasion.
a. Civil Penalty for Aiding & Abetting Understatement of Tax Liability
Section 6701 imposes a civil tax penalty for aiding and abetting the understate-
ment of tax. Specifically, Section 6701 applies to:
Any person who (1) aids or assists in, procures, or advises with respect
to, the preparation or presentation of any portion of a return, adavit,
claim, or other document, (2) who knows (or has reason to believe) that
such portion will be used in connection with any material matter arising
under the internal revenue laws, and (3) who knows that such portion (if
so used) would result in an understatement of the liability for tax of
another person[.]90
88. Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Circular 230, in CIRCULAR 230 DESKBOOK: RELATED
PENALTIES, REPORTABLE TRANSACTIONS, WORKING FORMS § 4:18.1[F] (2017) (discussing the knowingly
standard); see supra note 47 and accompanying text (what it means for a lawyer to "know").
89. 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(a).
90. I.R.C. § 6701(a).
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Despite the broad applicability of Section 6701,91 providing a referral, even for
a potential tax evader, is unlikely to meet the statute's requirements. This is for
multiple reasons.
First, the assistance provided by giving a referral is unlikely to be enough to trig-
ger Section 6701. Under Section 6701, a person only "assists in ... the preparation
or presentation of any ... document" 92 if the person is "directly involved in the aid-
ing or assisting in the preparation of a false or fraudulent document under the tax
laws."93 Even if a lawyer knows that the taxpayer wants help with tax eva-
sion, providing a referral to another tax adviser is, at most, indirect involve-
ment in the preparation of any false or fraudulent tax document because the
document is directly prepared by the referred (not the referring) lawyer. This
distinction between direct and indirect involvement is similar to the distinc-
tion between active and passive assistance relevant in the application of the
Model Rules.94
In addition, while the Section 6701 penalty also applies to someone who
"procures" a false or fraudulent document, the term "procures" generally
refers to a person's actions via a subordinate (or via any person whose actions
are controlled or overseen by the alleged procurer). 95 Where an individual
merely makes a referral and thereafter ceases to be involved with the matter
or the other lawyer, the referrer should not be treated as having "procured"
the materials produced by the referred lawyer.
Second, to impose a Section 6701 penalty, the adviser must have actual
knowledge that the document would (if used) result in an understatement
of tax liability.96 A referring lawyer whose involvement ends after making
the referral does not know the details of ultimate client representation.
Thus, he is unlikely to have the actual knowledge required by Section
6701, especially if the referring lawyer is uncertain as to whether the cli-
ent's desired plan would result in an understatement of tax. Even if he
believes that the client is determined to violate the law, the lawyer likely
still lacks the actual knowledge required by Section 6701 if he is uncertain
whether the referred lawyer will assist the client in pursuing the tax eva-
sion plan.
91. See David Weisbach & Brian Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Advisers, 130 TAx NOTES 1279
(Mar. 14, 2011).
92. I.R.C. § 6701(a)(1).
93. S. Rep. 97-494, at 275-76 (1982) (emphasis added); I.R.M. § 20.1.6.14.1; see also I.R.M § 20.1.6.14.5
(all examples involving direct action).
94. See supra Part II.A.
95. S. Rep. 97-494, at 275-76 (1982); I.R.C. § 6701(c); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 62, at ¶ 7B.16[1].
96. I.R.C. § 6701(a)(3); see, e.g., Rodrigues v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 122 (D.R.I. 1992) (applying an
actual knowledge standard); see also ALAN J. TARR & PAMELA JENSEN DRUCKER, 634-3d CIVIL TAX
PENALTIES VIII.B.2.b (2005); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 62, at ¶ 7B.16[1] (collecting cases).
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b. Criminal Penalty for Aiding or Assisting in Fraudulent or False Statements
Section 7206(2), which imposes criminal penalties for willfully aiding and
abetting tax fraud,97 "cover[s] much of the same ground as [Section 6701]," but
with "a higher standard of proof required."9 8 Thus, the Section 7206(2) criminal
penalty is even more unlikely to apply to a referring lawyer than is the Section
6701 civil penalty, which is itself unlikely to apply, as discussed above.
E. CONCLUSION ABOUT THE REFERRER'S PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL LIABILITY
The foregoing illustrates that a lawyer has a very low risk of being subject to pro-
fessional sanctions or legal liability (whether civil or criminal) as a result of provid-
ing a mere referral to a potential law-breaker. Even taking together the Model Rules,
the risk of criminal charges, the exposure to malpractice liability, and practice-area
specific rules (as in the tax example), referring lawyers are subject to very minimal
constraints. In sum, when providing a mere referral the lawyer should refer to a law-
yer that he reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter and confirm that
the referred lawyer is admitted to practice and in good standing in the relevant juris-
diction. 99 And particularly if the matter is (or is close to being) a matter that must be
mandatorily declined, the lawyer, when providing the referral, should discourage
the potential law-breaker and warn him against proceeding.
Yet this leaves a referring lawyer relatively unconstrained when providing a
mere referral for a potential law-breaker in connection with a matter that is too
aggressive for the lawyer to handle personally. This is likely true even if the law-
yer concludes that there is a high probability that the aspiring limit-pusher wants
to engage in criminal or fraudulent behavior.
III. THE REFERRER'S MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
The conclusion in Part II that a referring lawyer can provide a mere referral for
a potential law-breaker with very low risk of sanctions or liability does not,
97. I.R.C. § 7206(2) (providing that it is a felony, subject to a fine of up to $100,000 and up to 3 years of
imprisonment, to "[w]illfully aid[] or assist[] in, or procure[], counsel[], or advise[] the preparation or presenta-
tion under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit,
claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter . . ."); see TOSCHER, supra
note 70, at I.A.4. See generally Collins & Robbins, supra note 70, at § 13:2.4.
98. BITTKER, supra note 67, at ¶ 50.08[1]. The types of actions covered by Section 7206(2) are similar to
those covered by Section 6701, and, as discussed above, a lawyer who provides a mere referral is unlikely to
have taken such actions. See DOJ, supra note 62, at ¶ 13.08 (providing examples of the actions subject to sanc-
tion under 7206(2), which all involving affirmative/direct participation); see also supra Part II.D.2.a (discus-
sing the actions that are required to sustain a Section 6701 penalty). In addition, Section 7206(2) requires
"willful" behavior by the tax advisor, which makes it harder to establish criminal liability under Section 7206
(2) than to establish civil liability under Section 6701. I.R.C. § 7206(2) ("willfully"); see supra notes 64-66
and accompanying text (discussing the challenge of proving willfulness).
99. The referring lawyer should also ensure that that the referral is actually a "mere" referral, without referral
fees, continuing involvement, or undisclosed conflicts of interest. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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however, mean that the lawyer should provide the referral. This section argues
that a lawyer who provides a referral for a potential law-breaker bears some moral
responsibility for advancing the potential law-breaker's goals and for the actions
ultimately taken by the potential law-breaker with the help of the referral. To
explore the degree of and rationale for this moral culpability, this section
describes the causal link between the referring lawyer and the client's actions,
and then discusses the referring lawyer's moral culpability pursuant to the legal
profession's concept of the lawyer's role, the referring lawyer's own individual
concept of ethical lawyering, and broader notions of moral culpability of second-
ary actors.
A. THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE REFERRING LAWYER & THE
POTENTIAL LAW-BREAKER'S ACTIONS
Providing a referral to a potential law-breaker helps the potential law-breaker
get the assistance that the referring lawyer would not directly provide.
Specifically, having the name of another lawyer who might assist makes it easier
for the potential law-breaker to continue to pursue its limit-pushing (and perhaps,
limit-breaking) goals. Knowing whom to call for legal assistance makes the
potential law-breaker one step closer to achieving its potentially illicit goals.
Thus, providing the referral facilitates the potential law-breaker's ultimate
actions. In contrast, declining to provide a referral denies the potential law-
breaker help finding the lawyer it needs, thereby making it at least somewhat
harder for the potential law-breaker to continue to pursue its possibly illicit goals.
If the potential law-breaker wants to proceed after a lawyer has declined its mat-
ter, it must start anew, looking for names of lawyers who might be willing to
assist.
Moreover, the aspiring limit-pusher, upon receiving a referral, may infer
that the referring lawyer tacitly approves of or encourages the potential law-
breaker's limit-pushing plans, which could embolden the potential law-
breaker. This may be true even if the referring lawyer did not intend to imply
approval, and even if the referring lawyer explicitly cautioned the potential
law-breaker. In contrast, declining to provide a referral would more clearly sig-
nal disapproval.
Of course, providing a referral does not guarantee that even an aspiring law-
breaker will ultimately get the legal assistance needed to violate the law. A refer-
ring lawyer may provide the referral, but the referred lawyer might be able to
influence the potential law-breaker to take a lawful course of action, in which
case, no (potentially) illegal actions would arise as a result of the referral.
However, even in this case, the referring lawyer still furthered the potential law-
breaker's pursuit of limit-pushing, and perhaps law-breaking, goals, even if
someone else prevented it from achieving those goals. Alternatively, the referring
lawyer might provide the referral, but the referred lawyer might also decline the
representation, perhaps referring the potential law-breaker to yet another lawyer.
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That chain may continue, with each referred lawyer declining and referring the
potential law-breaker to someone else. If this happens repeatedly, the potential
law-breaker may ultimately be dissuaded from its desired course of action. Even
if the potential law-breaker ultimately abandons its limit-pushing or breaking
efforts, the referral perpetuates a pattern in which the potential law-breaker con-
tinues to spend time and energy, and to demand time and energy from others, in
pursuit of potentially noncompliant, rather than compliant, goals. And if the chain
of referrals does ultimately enable the potential law-breaker to find a lawyer who
will help it achieve illicit goals, the causal link to the illegal actions connects
back to each referrer in the chain, although the causal link to the original referrer
grows more attenuated with each additional referral.
Admittedly, refusing to provide a requested referral does not ensure that
the potential law-breaker will be stopped from achieving its limit-pushing or
breaking goals. It is possible that, without the referral, the potential law-
breaker might not be able to find a lawyer to help. However, even without a
referral, the potential law-breaker could use the internet, friends and family,
and other resources to find another lawyer to assist. At a minimum, however,
declining to provide a referral means that the potential law-breaker must
incur increased costs of searching for another lawyer and that the first lawyer
does not contribute to the potential law-breaker's pursuit of its limit-pushing
or breaking goal.
Thus, the referral (or lack thereof) is not determinative of whether the potential
law-breaker will (or will not) ultimately achieve illicit goals. Refusing to provide
a referral may dissuade the marginal potential law-breaker who was on the fence
about proceeding, but refusing to provide a referral is quite unlikely to deter a
determined law-breaker. On the other hand, providing a referral may embolden
the marginal potential law-breaker and makes it easier for any potential law-
breaker to find a lawyer to help it pursue its goals. As a result, a lawyer's decision
about whether to provide a referral may not affect compliance (except perhaps in
the most marginal cases), but the decision does determine whether the lawyer
contributes, even slightly, to the potential law-breaker's pursuit of and possible
success at noncompliance. That is, the lawyer, through its referral decision, may
not be able to stop a potential law-breaker, but he does make a choice about
whether he will be a part of the potential law-breaker's efforts to push limits or
break the law.
B. MORAL CULPABILITY BASED ON THE PROFESSION'S CONCEPTION OF
THE LAWYER'S ROLE
A lawyer's moral responsibility for providing a referral to a potential tax-
evader or other potential law-breaker derives, at least in part, from the profes-
sion's understanding of the lawyer's moral responsibility for the actions of, and
actions on behalf of, his client.
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Voluminous scholarship discusses the lawyer's moral responsibility.0 0 The
"traditional view" reflects a nonaccountability principle, pursuant to which, "[a]s
long as what the lawyer and client do is lawful, it is the client who is morally ac-
countable not the lawyer." 0 1 By relieving the lawyer of moral responsibility for
legal actions that he takes on behalf of his client, the principle of nonaccountabil-
ity embraces "role-differentiated behavior" in which "it is often appropriate and
many times even obligatory for the attorney to do things that, all other things
being equal, an ordinary person need not, and should not do." 10 2 Model Rule 1.2
(b) affirms this notion of role-differentiation and explains that "[a] lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement of the client's politi-
cal, economic, social or moral views or activities."1 03
The concepts of nonaccountability and role-differentiation have generated con-
siderable controversy among scholars and legal philosophers. For example,
Professor Stephen Pepper defends the "amoral role" of lawyers on grounds includ-
ing that "liberty and autonomy are a moral good," and that the exercise of such
autonomy is often dependent on access to the law.10 As a result, "if the conduct
which the lawyer facilitates ... is not unlawful-then ... what the lawyer does is a
social good [because t]he lawyer is the means to ... meaningful autonomy, for the
client."'0 Others may accept nonaccountability for criminal defense lawyers106 or,
more broadly, for lawyers serving as advocates107 but reject it for lawyers in other
contexts, particularly for lawyers who represent corporate clientsos or who are
otherwise engaged in transactional or other planning work.109 This context-specific
rejection of the principle of nonaccountability turns, in part, on the "absence of a
third-party arbiter" that can be entrusted "to reach a correct decision;"11o that is,
100. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
101. Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 614; Postema, supra note 10, at 73; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 671,
674; see generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at §§ 6.02,6.12.
102. Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 5; see generally HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 1.04.
103. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(b).
104. Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 616-17.
105. Id. at 617; see also Fried, supra note 10, at 1073 (moral insulation of lawyers enables clients to exercise
their autonomy and access the law).
106. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 154 (1988) (in contexts outside of criminal
defense, such as civil litigation or transactional work, "anything ... that is morally wrong for a nonlawyer to do
on behalf of another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well"); Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 5-13
(expressing uneasiness about the role-differentiated behavior for lawyers, particularly outside of the criminal
defense context).
107. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 669-71; see HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 29.02 (summarizing the debate
about the lawyer's role in the advocacy context).
108. See Painter, supra note 10, at 511-12,578 (arguing that that lawyers and clients are often "interdepend-
ent" particularly in the corporate context, in which case "lawyers cannot categorically deny moral responsibil-
ity for the conduct of their clients").
109. See, e.g., id.; Judith A. McMorrow & Luke M. Scheuer, The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate
Lawyer, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 275, 280-94 (2011); Daniel T. Ostas, Legal Loopholes and Underenforced Laws:
Examining the Ethical Dimensions of Corporate Legal Strategy, 46 Am. Bus. L.J. 487 (2009).
110. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 671,677.
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without a judge or similar party to determine the correct outcome of a matter, a
lawyer in transactional or other planning matters should be more accountable for
results achieved with his assistance. Further, Professor Murray Schwartz, among
others, argued that the nonadvocate should not be "granted the extraordinary insu-
lation from moral accountability provided the advocate" because "lawyers outside
the adversary system should not be obliged to assist all clients as a condition of
being licensed to practice law." 1 Professor Deborah Rhode and Professor
David Luban, among others, reject the principle of nonaccountability more
broadly and argue that "lawyers must assume personal moral responsibility
for the consequences of their professional actions"1 1 2 or that, at the very least,
as Professor Gerald Postema argued, each lawyer should seek to "integrat[e]
his own sense of moral responsibility into [his role as a lawyer]."11 3 Yet
others focus less on personal morality per se. For example, Professor William
Simon argues for understanding the lawyer's role as one that must promote
justice (meaning legal merit).114 And Professor Bradley Wendel argues that
lawyers must seek to implement the "achievement represented by law," with
"due regard to the meaning of legal norms," 115 because the law, "achieve[d
through] a pluralistic democracy," reflects society's collective moral judg-
ment, which should generally supplant lawyers' personal morality when they
are acting in their professional capacity.1 16
This debate about the lawyer's role need not be resolved to conclude that the law-
yer bears at least some moral responsibility for providing a referral to a potential
law-breaker. This is because the lawyer's moral responsibility for making a referral
is an extension of the lawyer's moral responsibility for his initial decision to accept
or decline a proffered client engagement. Lawyers generally have the discretion to
decline to represent a client for moral reasons1 17 or "to limit on moral ground the
111. Id. at 695.
112. Rhode, supra note 10, at 643; David Luban, How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and
Wendel, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1101 (2010) ("[Lawyers] cannot hide behind their role or the adversary
system to release themselves from the moral obligations they would have if they weren't lawyers."); see also e.
g., Michael Hatfield, The Effect of Legal Professionalization on Moral Reasoning: A Reply to Professor
Vischer and Professor Wendel, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 300, 301 (2010).
113. Postema, supra note 10, at 82.
114. SIMON, supra note 10, at 138. When scholars who focus on compliance with the law consider the mo-
rality of the lawyer's role, some view it as derived from the legality of the client's pursuits. See, e.g., Simon,
Ethical Discretion, supra note 10, at 1113-19; Fred Zacharais, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1387, 1394, 1404-05 (2004). These perspectives inform efforts to impose sometimes controversial gatekeeping
functions on lawyers, through which lawyers become directly responsible for preventing client misconduct.
See, e.g., id.; Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional
Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9 (2003). Cf. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy ofa Third-Party Liability Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) (endorsing a gatekeeping function,
but primarily from the perspective of incentives rather than professional ethics).
115. Wendel, Professionalism, supra note 4, at 1168-69.
116. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM L. REV. 363, 366, 403-04, 412-17 (2004) [herein-
after Wendel, Obedience].
117. MODEL RULES R. 6.2 cmt [1].
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objectives he will pursue for [the client]."' 1 Thus, the initial decision to represent a
client or handle a matter is, itself, an exercise of the lawyer's moral autonomy and is
thus open to criticism on moral grounds.119 Just as a lawyer's decision whether to
represent a client is an exercise of his moral autonomy, so too is the lawyer's deci-
sion about whether to provide a referral to the prospective client. And just as the
lawyer may be subject to criticism on moral grounds for accepting or rejecting a
proffered representation, the lawyer may be similarly subject to moral judgment for
his decision about whether to offer a referral. Admittedly, a lawyer's moral culpabil-
ity for providing a referral to a potential law-breaker is less than his moral culpabil-
ity for agreeing to represent the potential law-breaker1 20 because the lawyer has less
involvement with, and provides less assistance to, the prospective client when pro-
viding a mere referral. 12 1 Yet, providing the referral does help the potential law-
breaker implement its moral choices, 12 2 and the lawyer has the moral autonomy to
decline to provide a referral (and thereby to decline to help the client further its
goals) or to provide a referral only to another lawyer that he believes would take an
approach similar to his own. Thus, the lawyer becomes open to moral judgment
based on the referral decision.
The foregoing analysis arguably applies regardless of whether one accepts the
principle of nonaccountability. Rejecting nonaccountability, either in general or in
prospective planning matters such as those considered by this article, makes it partic-
ularly compelling to hold a lawyer morally responsible for his choice of clients, and
thus for his decision to provide a referral for a potential law-breaker. Where "the law-
yer is morally accountable for the job [he] performs and is not shielded from moral
criticism on the grounds that [he] is just doing [his] job," the "choice to adopt a partic-
ular project is [also] a moral choice" for which the lawyer bears moral responsibil-
ity. 12 Lawyers, especially when treated as morally accountable for their work on
behalf of clients, should be "encouraged to choose projects that reflect their vision of
personal morality"124 and should "be ready to defend their choice of representation
with reference to its social value and not simply to the justice system in which
118. Hodes, supra note 11, at 982; Schneyer, supra note 10, at 1565-66.
119. Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 10, at 199, 204-05; Hodes, supra note 11, at 982, 990.
See also Hatfield, supra note 112, at 301; HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 6.12.
120. The lawyer's moral culpability (whether for work done in representing the client, for his decision to
represent a client, or for his decision to provide a referral to a client he declines) is, of course, less than the cli-
ent's moral culpability for the actions it takes with a lawyer's assistance. For example, a lawyer who agrees to
assist with, or who provides a referral for a taxpayer who wishes to pursue, very aggressive tax avoidance is not
himself a very aggressive tax avoider or evader. HAZARD, supra note 10, at § 6.12 (a lawyer "still [has] a moral
account to settle (for agreeing to take up the client's matter rather than taking a pass)" but it is not for "endors-
ing the client's views or activities").
121. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 644 ("[M]oral responsibility depends on a variety of factors, including the
significance of harm and the agent's degree of involvement, knowledge and capacity to affect action.").
122. Painter, supra note 10, at 554 (a lawyer shares moral responsibility if he provides assistance to his cli-
ent to enable the client to implement the client's moral choices).
123. Hatfield, supra note 112, at 306. See also McMorrow & Scheuer, supra note 109, at 308.
124. Hatfield, supra note 112, at 306.
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lawyers practice."125 If a lawyer is morally responsible for work he does on behalf of
a client and for his decision to accept a client in the first instance, the lawyer should
be similarly morally responsible for providing the referral that assists in the continua-
tion of the prospective client's matter. That is, a lawyer should only assist in the mat-
ter's perpetuation (i.e., through a referral) if such perpetuation also reflects the
lawyer's vision of personal morality and if he can defend the decision to provide a
referral with reference to the merit of the client or matter. Thus, a lawyer who pro-
vides a referral and thereby helps a prospective client pursue potentially immoral or
illicit goals is subject to moral criticism for his contribution to the furtherance of the
prospective client's plans. Even if the lawyer provides a referral to another lawyer he
believes would also decline to assist the prospective client, providing any referral
"passes the buck" on to that next lawyer,126 and as Professor David Luban colorfully
explained, "mutual buck-passing either annihilates all responsibility or else generates
Chicken Games in which everyone tries to throw the burdens of responsibility on
someone else, with unfortunate consequences for all."1 2 7
Even accepting the nonaccountability principle, there is "moral significance" to
the decision to take on a matter1 28 and to provide a referral because the lawyer has
moral discretion to decline either or both.129 Indeed, if lawyers are free from moral
responsibility for lawful actions taken on behalf of a client during a representation,
it may be particularly important that the lawyer take his moral judgments "into
account in making the initial decision whether to enter into a particular lawyer-cli-
ent relationship" because his moral judgments become subordinated to the needs
of the client after the representation has commenced.13 0 Moreover:
because lawyers do have an almost unlimited discretion in selecting which clients
and causes to accept or reject, ... [scholars argue that] it is perfectly proper for
other lawyers or social critics to either condemn or praise lawyers on moral
grounds for the choices they make [about which clients and matters to handle].131
Lawyers similarly have great discretion when deciding whether, when, and to whom
to provide a referral. Thus, even if a lawyer is immune from moral condemnation for his
lawful actions taken during a given representation, the potential for moral critique
125. McMorrow & Scheuer, supra note 109, at 308.
126. Field, Panama Papers, supra note 12.
127. David Luban, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
955, 976 (1995) (in the context of discussing whether lawyers should bear responsibility for the work they do
for clients and the impact that work may have on others).
128. Wilkins, supra note 11, at 1039-40.
129. Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 10, at 199, 204-05 (regarding client selection); Hodes,
supra note 11, at 982 (same). But see Fried, supra note 10, at 1077-80 (acknowledging lawyer's discretion to
choose clients, including for reasons of the lawyer's personal moral preference, but implying that such a choice
should not be subject to judgment on moral grounds because "every exercise of the profession is morally worth-
while" and because imposing just moral judgment on the decision would logically lead to an objectionable con-
clusion about how lawyers ought to be obligated to allocate their services).
130. Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 10, at 199.
131. Hodes, supra note 11, at 982.
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should apply not only to the lawyer's decision at the outset to accept or decline a particu-
lar client representation, but should also extend to the lawyer's decision whether and to
whom to provide a referral if he declines the representation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the strictest view of the nonaccountability principle
rejects holding lawyers morally accountable for client selection if doing so "leads to
foreclosure of a person's access to the law." 132 Applying the same analysis to referrals
suggests that it might be inappropriate to hold lawyers morally accountable for perpetu-
ating questionable matters through referrals because holding lawyers so accountable
would likely discourage lawyers from providing referrals, thereby limiting access to the
law at least in some cases. That said, the premise of this article is that a lawyer has
declined a matter due to his discomfort with the morality or legality of the proposed mat-
ter and is then deciding whether to provide a referral.133 Unless that declination was
mandatory, that lawyer has already rejected the strictest view of the nonaccountability
principle by making a discretionary and possibly morally-driven decision about client
selection," which could itself limit the client's access to the law. Thus, the lawyer's
next step (i.e., whether to provide a referral) should adhere to the principles that the law-
yer already embraced and should not be governed by the strictest approach to nonac-
countability, which may have argued against declining the matter in the first instance.
Moreover, the refusal to provide a referral limits access to the law only marginally more
than the declination of the matter in the first instance because other lawyers may be
found if the prospective client is willing to incur the time and costs of search; refusal to
provide a referral merely means that the first lawyer refuses to reduce these costs for the
client. 135 Further, perhaps if the first lawyer's discomfort stems from how (il)legally
aggressive the client seeks to be, reducing this client's access to the law may actually
advance justice and good faith interpretations of law rather than inhibiting them.136
132. Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 634.
133. See supra Part I.B.
134. Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 617-18 (explaining that "refus[ing] to facilitate that which the law-
yer believes to be immoral, is to substitute the lawyer's beliefs for individual autonomy [of the client]" and
explaining that access to a lawyer should not "depend on an individual lawyer's conscience").
135. Cf. Rhode, supra note 10, at 621 ("Unless the lawyer is the last in town, his or her refusal to aid certain
endeavors will not necessarily preempt client choice. It may simply impose the psychological and financial cost
of finding alternative counsel.").
136. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 10, at 1136 (if a client's difficulty in getting a lawyer "reflects a
valid assessment of the legal merits of the client's claims and goals, there should be no concern at all [about the
client's 'unpopularity' and limited access to the law]"); Schwartz, supra note 10, at 693-94 (implying that it is
not necessarily a bad result if "all reasonably available lawyers refuse to assist because they have concluded
that the client's proposal entails immoral ends or means"). Cf. Wendel, Professionalism, supra note 4, at 1213-
18. In addition, if the notion of morality that is relevant for assessing the propriety of a lawyer's actions is not
individual morality but rather society's compromise about moral values as reflected in the achievement of the
law, then the lawyer should make choices that "implement the law as society has agreed upon." Wendel,
Obedience, supra note 116, at 382-85. Thus, the lawyer's choices (whether during a representation, when
choosing clients, or when deciding whether to provide a referral) should be subject to moral critique, based not
on individuals' personal moral values, but based on whether the lawyer implements society's collective moral
judgment (as reflected in the law) or, at least, implements a professional identity sanctioned by the norms of the
legal profession. See Wendel, Client Selection, supra note 11, at 1017-22, 1033.
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The foregoing analysis does not depend on the reasons for the lawyer's deci-
sions. Even if the lawyer's client selection or referral decisions were not made on
moral grounds, the lawyer, when choosing to accept or reject a matter and when
choosing to provide or not provide a referral, had opportunities to make morally-
based choices. 13 7 Thus, he remains open to critique for declining to make a
morally-motivated choice.
Of course, notions of morality vary from individual to individual, 138 and thus
different lawyers may make different moral choices in the same situation. Thus,
the foregoing generally does not demand that the lawyer decline to make a refer-
ral if he declines a matter. 13 9 Rather, it merely contends that the lawyer, when
choosing whether to make a referral should consider the moral implications of
his choice and be prepared to publicly justify (and accept criticism or praise for)
that choice.
C. MORAL CULPABILITY BASED ON THE INDIVIDUAL LAWYER'S
LAWYERING APPROACH
Regardless of the resolution of the debate within the legal profession about the
nonaccountability principle and its implications, a lawyer's approach to lawyer-
ing provides an individualized, rather than profession-wide, baseline against
which that lawyer's moral culpability for referrals can be assessed. Each lawyer
has his own professional identity that reflects his "answer to questions such as,
Who am I as a member of this profession? What am I like, and what do I want to
be like in my professional role? And what place do ethical-social values have in
my core sense of professional identity?"14 0 That professional identity incorpo-
rates a philosophy of lawyering,14 1 which reflects "the basic principles that a law-
yer uses to deal with the discretionary decisions that the lawyer faces in the
practice of law." 1 4 2
137. Rhode, supra note 10, at 623 ("[T]o decline to take a moral stance is in itself a moral stance and
requires justification as such.").
138. See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 10, at 123, 128. But see Wendel, Client Selection, supra note 11, at 1017-20 (the relevant notion of moral-
ity is not each individual's personal morality, but rather society's collective morality as reflected in the compro-
mise of the law).
139. But see infra Part IV.A. (recommending that no referral be provided if the declination/withdrawal was
mandatory pursuant to 1.16).
140. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 135 (2007), http://archive.camegiefoundation.org/pdfs/
elibrary/elibrary pdf632.pdf [https://perma.cc/33HL-5QNM]; see also Heather M. Field, Fostering Ethical
Professional Identity in Tax: Using the Traditional Tax Classroom, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 215, 222-25 (2017)
(summarizing various formulations of the definition of "professional identity") [hereinafter Field, Professional
Identity].
141. Field, Professional Identity, supra note 140, at 236 ("[A] lawyer can adopt one (or more) of several dif-
ferent philosophies of lawyering as the basis of [his] ethical professional identity.").
142. Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 75, 75 (2000) [hereinafter Crystal, Philosophy].
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Each lawyer's approach to lawyering is informed by the debate within the
larger legal profession about the lawyer's role, but his individual choice likely
reflects the aspects of that debate which most resonate with him. For example, a
lawyer who prioritizes client autonomy would likely adopt a "hired gun"
approach to lawyering, "acting at the direction of the boss/client, taking no
responsibility for injury to other people."14 3 A lawyer who believes that "lawyers
are morally accountable for the actions that they take on behalf of their clients,"
may adopt a "philosophy of morality," "assert[ing] moral control over [his] cli-
ents" and, "in situations in which lawyers had professional discretion ... [he]
would take the action that the lawyer believed to be indicated by principles of
morality."14 4 Alternatively, a lawyer who believes that it is his responsibility to
"promote justice," where "justice" is understood to mean "internal merit,"145
might adopt a legalist philosophy, acting as if he were an "unbiased, well-
informed judge" in accordance with "what a good-faith interpretation of the legal
rule would require in an ideal world without problems of proof, political bias, or
unequal wealth."146 These are merely three examples of a larger range of possible
lawyering philosophies. 14 7
Whatever a lawyer's philosophy of lawyering, the lawyer's moral responsibil-
ity for providing a referral can be judged against the lawyering guidelines that the
lawyer chooses for himself. Does the decision to provide a referral advance the
lawyer's vision of moral lawyering? If not, the lawyer is subject to criticism on
moral grounds-not for failure to adhere to other lawyers' interpretations of the
profession's standards, but rather for failure to adhere to his own guidelines for
moral lawyerly behavior.
For example, if a lawyer who adopts a moralist philosophy declines a proffered
matter because he believes that the client's objectives are immoral, then provid-
ing a referral and thereby helping the client to advance its immoral aims would be
hypocritical. Similarly, if a legalist lawyer believes that all lawyers ought to take
only those actions that advance internal legal merit, then he could be subject to
moral critique for providing a referral to a potential law-breaker. In contrast, if
the legalist lawyer believes that it is acceptable for the profession to assist even
143. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 3,
16-29 (2d ed. 2009). See Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 142, at 86-87; Margaret Ann Wilkinson et al.,
Mentor, Mercenary or Melding: An Empirical Inquiry into the Role of the Lawyer, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 373,
380 (1996) ("[Tlhe only responsibility of a hired gun is to pursue the goals that have been defined by the client
alone.").
144. Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 142, at 89-90; SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 142, at 3,30-41.
145. Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 10, at 1090, 1096-98.
146. Ostas, supra note 109, at 516-18; see also Nathan M. Crystal, Using the Concept of "Philosophy of
Lawyering" in Teaching Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1235, 1242-44 (2007) (discussing a
philosophy of lawyering based on "institutional values" rather than morality) [hereinafter Crystal, Teaching].
147. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 143, at 5-15, 42-65 (also describing the "godfather" and
"friend" models); Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer, supra note 35, at 280-95 (describing six distinct lawyering
philosophies).
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aggressive clients to further their autonomy but merely prefers not to assist per-
sonally with any matter that is not likely to comply with the law, providing the
referral should not draw similar moral condemnation.
Many lawyers have not explicitly identified their lawyering philosophies,148
but the way a lawyer makes common discretionary decisions reflects his implicit
notion of how he conceives of the lawyer's role. That provides enough insight
into the lawyer's approach to hold the lawyer accountable for the moral coher-
ence of his choices. When the lawyer declines a proffered matter, he should be
able to justify the reasons for the declination.14 9 His justification for declining the
matter can then be compared to his justification for providing (or not providing)
the referral to determine whether the decisions are consistent; this analysis would
be very similar to that described above for the lawyer who had clearly articulated
his lawyering philosophy. Thus, for example, if the lawyer declines a potential
tax-evader's matter because the taxpayer wishes to take a very aggressive tax
position and the lawyer does not think that taxpayers should pursue or lawyers
should assist with such aggressive avoidance techniques, providing a referral for
that potential tax evader would be inconsistent. In contrast, providing a referral
presents no inconsistency if a lawyer declines a matter merely because it is out-
side his area of expertise, because he lacks the time to serve the client well, or
because, although he does not object to lawyers assisting clients in pursuit of
aggressive matters, he does not want to assist with such matters personally.
Ultimately, inconsistency between the justification for declining the matter in
the first instance and the justification for providing the referral merits criticism on
moral grounds because the lawyer may be failing to live up to his own lawyering
principles. For that, a lawyer bears moral responsibility.
D. BROADER CONCEPTS OF MORAL CULPABILITY FOR ACCOMPLICES
A referring lawyer's moral responsibility could also be judged based on
broader theories of blameworthiness and culpability that underpin the rules that
impose legal liability,5 o particularly as applied to criminal sanctions for parties
148. But see Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 142, at 94-98 (encouraging lawyers to be explicit about their
lawyering philosophies); Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer, supra note 35, at 318-19 (same).
149. See, e.g., Freedman, Justification, supra note 11, at 112.
150. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND
METAPHYSICS (2009); H.L. A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). This article's discussion
of the moral culpability of referring lawyers generally does not draw on notions of responsibility in tort law, in
large part because, although tort law is heavily based on the concept of "fault," the wrongs in tort are often not
considered "moral wrongs." See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REv. 917, 921-22, 930-32, 986 (2010) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 204 (1881),
for the idea that "tort law was thus fault-based in the sense of rejecting strict liability, but was not fault-based in
the sense of conditioning liability on the commission of a morally wrongful act"). In contrast, criminal law
much more closely links legal responsibility with moral blame. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
1526--4 (1992).
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who assist, influence, or encourage, but do not personally commit, a wrongful
act. 51 However, in contrast to the analyses provided above, providing a referral
to a potential law-breaker is unlikely to make the referring lawyer morally re-
sponsible under criminal notions of accomplice complicity. Although there is
debate among scholars about exactly what mental state and specific actions
should be required for accomplice liability, 15 2 higher thresholds of blameworthi-
ness are generally required when imposing criminal sanctions rather than merely
reprobation.
For example, for a secondary actor to be blameworthy enough to be crimi-
nally-punishable for the crimes of another, the secondary actor "must act with the
intention of influencing or assisting the primary actor to engage in the conduct
constituting the crime,"153 or at least provide assistance "with the knowledge that
it will promote or facilitate a crime."154 These concepts of intent and knowledge
implicate the secondary actor's moral agency (i.e., his ability to tell right from
wrong and make judgments based on that understanding, such that it is appropri-
ate to evaluate him and potentially hold him accountable for his actions).5 5
Although scholars debate about what the precise contours of these intent and
knowledge measures of blameworthiness are and should be for imposing criminal
liability,156 providing a referral, even to an aspiring law-breaker, is unlikely to
demonstrate the intent or knowledge that is sufficiently blameworthy to merit
criminal sanctions. For example, the fact that the referring lawyer declines a mat-
ter provides evidence that the referring lawyer may not intend to assist the pro-
spective client in criminal conduct;157 the referring lawyer may merely intend
that someone else dissuade the client from pursuing its illicit objectives.
Moreover, even if the referred lawyer accepts the referred representation, the
151. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation ofDoctrine,
73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985); Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding,
and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007); see also generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 13.2, 13.3 (2d ed. 2017).
152. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 151; Alexander F. Sarch, Condoning the Crime: The Elusive Mens Rea
for Complicity, 47 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 131 (2015).
153. Kadish, supra note 150, at 346-55; see LAFAVE, supra note 151, at § 13.2(b), (c). But see Gideon
Yaffe, Intending to Aid, 33 L. & PHIL. 1, 10 (2014) (arguing that the intent requirement for accomplice liability
should be lower).
154. LAFAVE, supra note 151, at § 13.2(b), (d); see Matthew A. Smith, Advice and Complicity, 60 DUKE L.
J. 499, 529 (2010) (discussing the knowledge standard for treating a lawyer as criminally complicit).
155. Arenella, supra note 150, at 1520-26; see also Peter A. French, Complicity: That Moral Monster,
Troubling Matters, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 575, 576-77, 587-89 (2016) (contending that internal intent is what
matters for purposes of moral accountability).
156. See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 151, at 349-55 (describing "strains in application" of the intent require-
ment); Sarch, supra note 152, at 134, 162-72 (arguing that the mens rea standard for complicity should focus
on the defendant's "attitude of condoning the underlying crime").
157. A referring lawyer could intend to assist the client in very aggressive (even possibly non-compliant),
but not criminal, conduct. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 685 ("[N]ot all outcomes which are neither criminal
nor fraudulent are 'legal'.").
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referring lawyer's lack of involvement in the subsequent representation and the
referring lawyer's knowledge that the referred lawyer has a professional obliga-
tion not to knowingly assist with criminal or fraudulent conduct make it hard to
conclude that the referring lawyer knows that a referral will ultimately facilitate
criminal activity.5 8 That is, when a lawyer provides a referral for a potential law-
breaker, he quite likely does so without a mental state that is blameworthy enough
to merit criminal sanctions.
Further, some notions of criminal culpability for accomplices depend on con-
tribution to the harm caused,15 9 which reflects the "fair attribution" of the harm
created to the actor's moral agency.16 0 This approach would likely relieve a refer-
ring lawyer of accountability if the prospective client does not ultimately commit
a criminally wrongful act or if the client does commit a crime but does not do so
with the assistance of the referral. In addition, the intervention of another lawyer
who voluntarily agrees, rather than declines, to take responsibility for advising
and assisting the client, may serve to "break the causal chains" that could other-
wise have existed between the referring lawyer and the client's ultimate criminal
conduct, thereby relieving the referring lawyer from moral culpability, at least for
criminal law purposes.16 1
A full exploration of criminal accomplice liability, its requirements, and its
philosophical underpinnings is outside the scope of this article, but even this brief
discussion demonstrates that the degree of blameworthiness that would merit
criminal sanction is quite likely lacking in the case of the lawyer who provides a
mere legal referral to a potential law-breaker.
E. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE REFERRER'S MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Ultimately, the extent of a referring lawyer's moral responsibility for refer-
rals, particularly those provided to potential law-breakers, depends on the
158. See Smith, supra note 154, at 528-33 (discussing factors that could help determine whether a "lawyer's
conduct crossed a boundary from advice into [criminal] complicity").
159. Kadish, supra note 151, at 355-68 (explaining that "the doctrine of complicity ... requires a result. It
is not a doctrine of inchoate liability" and "the secondary party must have succeeded in contributing to [the
criminally unlawful result]," although that contribution need not be a but-for cause of the result). But see
French, supra note 155, at 587-88 (arguing that moral responsibility ought not to turn on the "moral luck" of
whether a particular result arises). Some scholars argue that it would be "more morally justifiable" if sanctions
for accomplices were "proportionate to the degree of participation in the crime, their degree of control or he-
gemony over others, or the harm they actually caused" and were not necessarily equal to the sanction imposed
on the principle. Dressler, supra note 151, at 140; see also Moore, supra note 151, at 420-51 (discussing differ-
ences in blameworthiness of different types of accomplices); Sarch, supra note 152, at 148-72 (arguing that
whether accomplice liability is warranted should depend on whether the purported accomplice condoned the
crime rather than using a derivative approach based on the underlying crime); Baruch Weiss, What Were They
Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1341, 1486-90 (2002) (examining the mental state that should be required for accomplice liability, recom-
mending a "modified derivative approach"). When considering a referring lawyer's moral responsibility under
criminal law, it is the existence, rather than degree, of criminal sanction that is of primary concern.
160. Arenella, supra note 150, at 1520, 1522-23.
161. Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REv. 827, 828 (2000).
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framework for assessment. The referring lawyer's culpability varies depending
on whether moral responsibility is evaluated against professional norms, self-
created standards, the requirements for imposing criminal sanctions, or other-
wise, and it depends on precisely how those norms, standards, and require-
ments are defined. It depends on whether the prospective client's goal is
criminal, something aggressive but less culpable, or clearly legal but immoral
in the opinion of the referring lawyer. It depends on how much the referring
lawyer knows about those goals. 16 2 And it depends on whether the referring
lawyer's moral culpability is tied to the mere furtherance of the client's goals
(whether or not ultimately achieved) or whether it depends on the client's
actual achievement of those goals.
However, these factors go to the degree, context, and consequence of the refer-
ring lawyer's moral responsibility rather than to its existence. A referring lawyer
risks bearing moral responsibility and being subject to judgment on moral
grounds for providing a referral, at least to some degree and at least under some
frameworks.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE REFERRER'S PROFESSIONAL
OBLIGATIONS/LEGAL LIABILITY & THE REFERRER'S MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Lawyers should take seriously the moral responsibility they bear for providing
referrals, and they can do so by adhering to higher standards than those proscribed
by the professional conduct and legal liability rules. Doing more than the mini-
mum required to avoid sanctions and liability also protects lawyers from adverse
consequences that could arise if the applicable authorities are interpreted more
broadly, if the applicable rules change, or if the referring lawyer inadvertently
retains more involvement in the referred matter than he intended.163 This section
makes recommendations about how lawyers can handle referral requests in a
manner that better lives up to their own, and the profession's, sense of moral
responsibility.
Out of deference to each lawyer's own moral autonomy and given questions
about the degree, context, and consequence of lawyers' moral culpability for
162. Under any of the frameworks discussed above, the amount of moral responsibility and the harshness of
any judgment levied on moral grounds should depend partly on what the lawyer knows about the matter being
referred. A lawyer who provides a referral despite knowing that the prospective client is quite determined to
break the law should be judged more harshly than a lawyer who provides a referral without knowing what the
prospective client's true intentions are. However, even a lawyer who provides a referral without knowing the
client's true intentions remains open to moral judgment for, among other things, perpetuating a questionable
matter about which he clearly had some qualms. Moreover, a lawyer should not be able to reduce his moral
responsibility for a referral by being willfully blind to a prospective client's intentions. Thus, although a law-
yer's knowledge of the facts of the referred matter may affect how harshly he is judged for his referral decision,
lack of detailed knowledge about the matter ought not to absolve him entirely from any moral judgment for his
referral decision.
163. See Field, Panama Papers, supra note 12.
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referrals, the recommendations set forth below are voluntary, not mandatory.
Thus, the below does not propose changes to the rules that govern lawyers' pro-
fessional conduct or that otherwise impose liability on lawyers. However, volun-
tary adoption of the approach described herein will enable lawyers to make more
morally defensible decisions when responding to requests for referrals.
A. THE EASY CASES-JUST SAY NO
The egregious cases, when the lawyer mandatorily declines or withdraws
because he knows that the client's behavior will violate the law, are the easiest.
The lawyer should refuse to provide a referral.
The client should not take actions that violate the law, and no lawyer
should assist the client with such actions. A lawyer who provides a referral
knowing that the client will insist on using the representation to violate the
law, incrementally encourages and furthers the client's known illegal goals.
Thus, the refusal to provide a referral protects the rule of law and curtails cli-
ent autonomy and access to the law in precisely the situations where they
should be curtailed. Such refusal is consistent even with the strictest version
of the nonaccountability approach to the lawyer's professional role. And such
refusal advances and is consistent with any ethical lawyer's individual
approach to lawyering.
B. THE HARDER CASES-TOOLS FOR MAKING MORALLY DEFENSIBLE
REFERRAL DECISIONS
The question of whether to provide a referral is more challenging when the
lawyer declines or withdraws discretionarily. In these situations, a lawyer
should respond to the moral concerns raised in this article by analyzing the
referral request using his lawyering philosophy and a risk-based analysis in
which he gauges the risks posed by the client, the matter, and the referred
lawyer.
1. USING A LAWYERING PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDE
Using one's lawyering philosophy as a guide for making difficult discretionary
decisions helps the lawyer maintain his "personal integrity [and] inner moral
compass,"164 thereby helping him stay true to the type of lawyer he wants
164. Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527, 530 (1994);
see also AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS
AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 204, 213 (1992) (citing "a lawyer's personal sense of morality" as
an important guide and identifying "promoting justice, fairness, and morality in one's own daily practice" as a
fundamental value of the profession); SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 143, at 1-2 (prefacing the book's dis-
cussion of lawyering philosophies by posing questions about the morality of lawyers); Field, Ethical Tax
Lawyer, supra note 35, at 297-99 (arguing that having a lawyering philosophy helps a lawyer make "difficult
discretionary decisions" in a principled way).
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to be.165 Thus, whatever a lawyer's philosophy of lawyering, his personal concep-
tion of the lawyer's role should inform his decisions 66 about whether to accept a
proffered representation and whether to provide a referral to a prospective client
whose matter he declines. If he declined the representation truly due to lack of ex-
pertise, time, or admission in a particular jurisdiction, he should have no qualms
about providing a referral if he knows of competent counsel. If he declined the
representation because he did not want to handle such an aggressive matter, he
should use the same analytical approach (i.e., relying on his philosophy of law-
yering and his assessment of the client's plan or goals) to help him decide
whether to provide a referral.
Returning to the example of the potential tax evader, a lawyer who adopts a
legalist philosophy of lawyering (i.e., only wanting to assist on matters where
the tax treatment is more likely than not to be correct) would decline a matter
that he thought had less than fifty percent chance of success on the merits. His
subsequent decision whether to provide the potential tax evader with a legal
referral should depend on whether he believes all lawyers should take a legalist
approach or whether he believes that more aggressive lawyering approaches
are acceptable within the profession (just not for him). If the former, he should
not provide the referral because providing a referral encourages tax practice
that is contrary to his vision of a moral tax profession. If the latter, he might be
willing to provide a referral depending on how aggressive the client seeks to
be. If the client's goals are within what he views as acceptable tax practice for
other lawyers (e.g., perhaps he believes that it is acceptable for other tax law-
yers to assist on matters as long as there is "reasonable basis"), he would pro-
vide a referral if the matter likely meets that standard, but he would not provide
a referral for more aggressive clients or plans.
If the lawyer lacks an explicit philosophy of lawyering, he should articulate for
himself his justification for declining the matter, and then ask himself what that
same reasoning would mean for the referral decision.167
Thus, the lawyer can use his lawyering approach, which informed his deci-
sion to decline the matter, to help him make another difficult discretionary
decisionl 68-about whether to provide the requested referral. Admittedly,
these judgment calls may be clearer when withdrawing than when declining
because, in the latter, the lawyer has limited information about the client or
165. Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer, supra note 35, at 300-01 (arguing that using a lawyering philosophy as a
guide for principled decision-making helps a lawyer "practic[e] in accordance with [his] values").
166. Id. at 297-98; Crystal, Philosophy, supra note 142, at 93; Crystal, Teaching, supra note 146, at 1240.
167. A slightly different way to think about this is for the lawyer to ask himself whether he is willing to
remain involved enough to earn a referral fee under the Model Rules. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
If he is not, he should be able to articulate why not, and those reasons can provide guidance about whether he
should (perhaps not) provide a referral at all.
168. See Field, Ethical Tax Lawyer, supra note 35, at 296-99 (encouraging tax lawyers to use their lawyer-
ing philosophy to guide them in making difficult discretionary decisions).
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matter on which to judge the moral coherence of his actions.169 However, using
a lawyering philosophy to inform the lawyer's referral decision enables the
lawyer to use his internal sense of honorable practice to determine whether he
wants to assist with the continuation of the matter. This approach prevents him
from merely punting on the moral choice and deferring to the referred lawyer.
As a result, the lawyer takes more personal moral responsibility for the referral
and its consequences. 1 70
2. EMPLOYING A RISK-BASED APPROACH
Whether the referral request follows a withdrawal or declination, a lawyer
should employ a "risk-based approach" 1 7 1 to help him determine whether pro-
viding a referral is consistent with his vision of moral lawyering and, more
broadly, with the profession's concept of the lawyer's role. Under this
approach, the lawyer assesses the risks posed by the referred lawyer and the
risks posed by the client or matter. As the risk of law-breaking or moral repug-
nancy increases, the lawyer would be increasingly cautious about whether and
to whom to provide a referral.
a. Gauge Risks Posed by the Referred Lawyer
Guidance about assessing the risks posed by a lawyer or firm to whom a refer-
ral may be provided can be drawn from literature regarding (a) avoiding claims
for negligent referral, 172 and (b) discharging ethical obligations when identifying
and working with local or co-counsel. 173
Good practices include doing more research about referral possibilities,
beyond merely confirming admission to practice in the relevant jurisdiction. 174
Steps include, for example, doing a background check on the lawyer; 175
169. See supra Part I.A.2.
170. There is a risk here, though, that declining to make the referral, particularly in situations where the pro-
spective client's matter is not particularly aggressive, limits the client's access to the law. See infra Part IV.C.3.
171. See, e.g., AM. BAR. Ass'N, VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND
COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING 1-2 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal-justice section newsletter/crimjust taskforce-gtfgoodpracticesguidance
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/28N8-VX3R] (encouraging a risk-based approach to curtail lawyers'
involvement in clients' money laundering and terrorist financing) [hereinafter ABA, GOOD PRACTICES].
172. See Temkin, supra note 16; see also Steven L. Cantor & Alexandre M. Denault, Legal Ethical Issues in
International Estate Planning, 42 EST. PLAN. 31, 34 (2015) (making recommendations that "mitigate against
the risk of culpability for negligent referral").
173. See, e.g., Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional Responsibilities
of Practitioners, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 53, 79-81 (1992-93) (providing guidance regarding selecting foreign
counsel); Richmond, supra note 17. Some recommendations from these other contexts are not particularly rele-
vant in the mere referral context because they involve considerations relevant to managing co-counsel-type rela-
tionships between the referring lawyer and the referred lawyer. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17, at 1428-41,
1446-51, 1454-61 (regarding competence, confidentiality, and conflicts issues in multi-lawyer relationships).
174. See Richmond, supra note 17, at 485-87.
175. Cantor & Denault, supra note 172, at 34.
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reviewing publications of, and distinctions earned by, the lawyer;176 checking the
"lawyer's fluency in the language to be used in communication" with the referred
client (particularly if the referral is to foreign counsel);177 and trying to "deter-
mine the ... lawyer's expertise in [the relevant type of] transactions, general rep-
utation for honesty, ... and education and training."178
This type of investigation enables the referring lawyer to better assess the risk
that the other lawyer would help the client engage in unlawful or highly question-
able activity. This allows the referring lawyer to better gauge whether he would
be facilitating law-breaking (or morally repugnant activity) by referring a client
to a particular lawyer.
In addition, referring counsel might want to confirm that the counsel has
adequate and up-to-date malpractice insurance, possibly requesting malpractice
indemnification from the referred lawyer.179 These steps would be most relevant
where the referring lawyer is concerned about liability for negligent referral.
b. Evaluate Risks Posed by the Client/Matter
In addition to considering the risks posed by the referred lawyer, a referring
lawyer should evaluate the risks posed by the client and the client's matter.
Insight into how to do so can be gleaned from the Financial Action Task
Force's ("FATF") recommendations for inhibiting money laundering and terro-
rist financing, which served as a model for the risk-based approach recommended
herein. 80 The FATF's specific recommendations for legal professionals8 1 have
been implemented in the United States by the American Bar Association
("ABA") via voluntary good practices for lawyers. 18 2 These resources provide
useful guidance for lawyers considering referrals for potential law-breakers
because both the FATF's concern and the referral question considered herein
focus on lawyers who assist potential law-breakers, even if unintentionally. 18 3
Further, lawyers assisting clients with aggressive tax avoidance, questionable
asset concealment, or conduct arguably approaching fraud, may undertake
176. Id.
177. Lutz, supra note 173, at 80.
178. Id.
179. Temkin, supra note 16, at 677.
180. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 4, 11, 15, 31 (Feb. 2012), http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.
cc/YJT2-Q5ZG].
181. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J52-7FMU].
182. ABA, GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 171, at 3; see generally Kevin L. Shepherd, The Gatekeeper
Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good Practices
Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, 2010 J. PROF. LAw. 83, 96-97 (2010); Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession
Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 487, 505-06 (2015).
183. See Terry, supra note 182, at 501-03 (discussing efforts to "help[] lawyers avoid unwittingly assisting
clients who are engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing") (emphasis in original).
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activities similar to those of concern to the FATF (e.g., managing, buying, or sell-
ing client funds/assets, or creating or operating companies, legal persons, or other
arrangements for the client).184 Thus, a lawyer considering providing a referral to
someone who would undertake these activities should consider the risks flagged
in the FATF guidance and ABA good practices. Even for different potential law-
breaking activities that may be less similar to activities involving money launder-
ing or terrorist financing, a risk-based approach inspired by FATF helps lawyers
identify potential red flags for consideration when determining whether further-
ing the matter (even incrementally) through a referral would be morally question-
able under norms of professional conduct or would be inconsistent with the
lawyer's own approach to moral lawyering.
Importing some of the FATF recommendations, as implemented by the
ABA,1 " into the context of referrals for potential law-breakers suggests that the
referring lawyer should do at least minimal "client due diligence," considering
risks in three specific risk categories (i.e., country/geographic risk, client risk,
and service risk), and accounting for various risk variables. Client due diligence
would include "identify[ing] and appropriately verify[ing] the identity of each
client on a timely basis,"18 6 possibly "identify[ing] ... and verify[ing] the identity
of the beneficial owner," 18 7 and "obtain[ing] information to understand the cli-
ent's circumstances and business depending on the nature, scope, and timing of
the services to be provided." 8 8 This client due diligence provides the referring
lawyer with information that helps him to evaluate "client risks," "country/geo-
graphic risks," and "service risks" associated with the potential referral.189
For example, consider what "client due diligence" would entail when con-
sidering a referral for a potential tax evader.1 90 When evaluating "client
risks," the lawyer should look for client-specific factors that suggest a higher
chance of tax evasion. Factors could include whether the client is engaged in
"unusual activity," has a "cash intensive business," has "certain criminal con-
victions," has "no address/multiple addresses," or seems to have or be seek-
ing "arrangements without any apparent legal or legitimate tax, business,
economic or other reasons."191 When evaluating "country/geographic risks",
184. See ABA, GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 171, at 12; Shepherd, supra note 182, at 127 (citing a situation
where a bank surmised that a transaction was motivated by either money laundering or tax evasion efforts).
185. Many of the FATF recommendations as implemented by the ABA are not applicable to the referral
context because they assume an ongoing representation. Thus, the discussion herein focuses on the FATF rec-
ommendations relevant to client intake. See ABA, GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 171, at 32-34.
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id. (internal footnote omitted). This recommendation is more controversial, and under the FATF guide-
lines, "[1]awyers may use a risk-based approach when determining the extent to which they are required to iden-
tify the beneficial owner." Id.
188. Id. at 10.
189. See id. at 15.
190. This section highlights the risks discussed in the FATF guidance that are most likely to provide insight
into the potential for tax evasion.
191. See ABA, GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 171, at 17-21.
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lawyers should "take into account the client's domicile, the location of the
transaction, and the source of the funding." 19 2 In the tax evasion context, this
likely means that a client seeking a referral to a lawyer in a known tax haven
poses a greater risk of tax evasion. As to "service risks," lawyers should be
alert to services, which if requested of lawyers, present a heightened risk of
tax evasion. Such services could include where the lawyer is requested to
form "shell companies" or help "conceal[] beneficial ownership."19 3 Also,
"extraordinary legal fees,"194 which in the tax context could include a per-
centage of the realized tax savings as part of the fee, could indicate a greater
possibility of tax evasion.
When evaluating the risks, lawyers should consider "risk variables" 1 95 that
provide information about the likelihood that the client will pursue law-
breaking behavior. Continuing with the potential tax evader example, the re-
ferring lawyer could consider the "nature" and "regularity/duration" of his
preexisting relationship with the client (if any);1 96 the longer the relationship
and the less evasion-focused the client has been, the lower the future risk.
The referring lawyer could also consider the "reputation and publicly avail-
able information about the client," whether there is a "geographic disparity"
between the client and the legal work that the client wants done, and what
that disparity may mean for the likelihood that the client is seeking assistance
with evasion. 1 97
Together, these inquiries and assessments help the lawyer evaluate the
likelihood that the client would use (or try to use) the referral to pursue illegal
tax evasion, remembering, however, that no one factor is dispositive. For
potential law-breakers in other areas of law, the lawyer would, of course,
need to tailor the inquiries to focus the client due diligence on "client risks,"
"country/geographic risks," "service risks," and "risk variables" that are rele-
vant to the particular type of law-breaking that the lawyer thinks the client
might want to pursue. However, the FATF framework, as implemented by the
ABA, and the application of that framework to a referral for a potential tax
evader provide guidance about how to assess the law-breaking risk posed by
a particular client or matter. And if morality (rather than legality) is what led
the lawyer to decline or withdraw from the matter, the lawyer could use a
similar risk-based analysis, tweaking the details of the diligence questions, to
assess the risk that the client would use the referral to pursue a morally repug-
nant course of action.
192. Id. at 15-16.
193. See id. at 266.
194. See id. at 25.
195. See id. at 28-32.
196. Id. at 28-30.
197. See id. at 29, 31.
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c. Putting the Pieces Together in the Harder Cases
The approach recommended herein accepts that facts are often uncertain or
unknown and that the legality and morality of positions are often unclear, espe-
cially with limited facts. Of course, limited facts make it harder for a lawyer to
evaluate a proffered matter, to decide whether to accept or reject that matter, and
to determine whether to provide a referral if the lawyer declines the matter. But
the lawyer can still employ a risk-based approach to a referral question and can
still make a well-considered referral decision using the facts that he has.
Moreover, any lack of information or clarity about the proffered matter can be
understood as factors that increase the risk associated with the client or matter.
But the presence of risk, even a relatively high level of risk, is not determinative
of whether the lawyer should provide the referral. Rather, the lawyer must exer-
cise his judgment using whatever information and insights he has.
Ultimately, the higher the risk the lawyer perceives (whether that risk
comes from the particular referred lawyer, the client's approach, the details
of the matter, a lack of knowledge of the details, or otherwise) and the less
that taking that risk is consistent with the lawyer's professional identity, the
more the lawyer should consider not providing a referral. If the lawyer pro-
vides a referral despite high risks and despite possible inconsistency with his
lawyering philosophy, the lawyer should strongly caution the client when
giving the referral or provide referrals to lawyers he knows to practice in ac-
cordance with his lawyering philosophy (e.g., conservative rather than
aggressive, or sharing his view of morality). In addition, the lawyer should
consider recommending multiple lawyers and letting the client choose among
them, thereby reducing the link between the referring lawyer and the referred
lawyer.198
C. IMPACTS OF THE RECOMMENDED REFERRAL APPROACH
1. PROMOTING GREATER PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFERRALS WHILE
RESPECTING LAWYERS' MORAL AUTONOMY
The foregoing approach to referrals encourages and empowers lawyers to
take more personal responsibility for their contribution to potential law-break-
ers' goals. Explaining the moral concerns created by referrals for potential
law-breakers increases the salience of these concerns, hopefully dissuading
lawyers from blithely punting to the next lawyer the responsibility for dealing
with a challenging client that has morally or legally questionable objectives.
And by furnishing an analytical framework for considering referral requests,
198. Cantor & Denault, supra note 172, at 34. The referring lawyer does not impose his judgment about the
identity of the right counsel. Instead, he merely provides options and empowers the client to judge which other
lawyer is most well-suited to assist.
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this article provides concrete steps that help lawyers make morally defensible
decisions about whether to contribute to the perpetuation of declined matters.
Although this article's approach pushes lawyers to take more personal respon-
sibility when making referrals, it still respects lawyers' moral autonomy by pro-
viding a framework within which a lawyer can determine for himself whether
and to whom to provide a referral. Except in the mandatory declination or with-
drawal situation, no particular result is dictated. Similarly, the use of a risk-based
approach, rather than a "rule-based" approach (which would demand "compl
[iance] with particular laws, rules, or regulations irrespective of the [lawyer's
assessment of the] underlying quantum of risk"1 99), empowers each lawyer to use
his own judgment. Thus, this article's recommendation acknowledges that law-
yers have a range of perspectives about choices that are morally defensible and
those that deserve critique, and it encourages each lawyer to implement his own
perspective consistently, thereby respecting each lawyer's moral autonomy.
Ultimately, a lawyer has to live with himself and with how he discharges his role,
and the foregoing framework helps him respond to referral requests in a manner
that reflects his sense of morality both as a lawyer and as a person.
2. PROVIDING A MORALLY-FOCUSED RESPONSE TO THE REFERRAL COMPLICITY
PROBLEM
In addition, the voluntary approach recommended herein responds directly
to the concerns raised herein-moral responsibility, which is an internally-
driven matter of conscience rather than an externally-imposed matter of
rules. Indeed, "moral behavior is, by definition, voluntary," 20 0 and charging
someone with moral accountability for a decision does not mandate that pro-
fessional sanctions or legal liability also attach to that decision. 201 Thus, this
article's recommendation responds to a moral quandary with a framework
through which lawyers can make more morally defensible decisions, but it
leaves unchanged the rules of professional conduct and legal liability dis-
cussed in Part II above.
Imposing mandatory professional conduct rules limiting lawyers' discretion
about referrals to potential law-breakers would be too much, at least without
more consensus within the profession about (non)accountability and the lawyer's
199. ABA, GOOD PRACTICES, supra note 171, at 1-2 (describing the approach taken by the FATF, as
adopted by the ABA).
200. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1303,
1377 (1995).
201. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 696 ("This conclusion [that nonadvocates should not be insulated from
moral accountability for their actions on behalf of clients] ... imposes no substantive or professional liability if
the nonadvocate proceeds to assist the client, even though the lawyer believes that the behavior is immoral or
unjust."); Painter, supra note 10, at 513-14 ("It is also important to distinguish this discussion of moral
responsibility-responsibility for adherence to one's own moral principles-from two related topics:
legal responsibility, whether a person is responsible for conduct incurring criminal or civil liability, and professio-
nal responsibility, whether a person is responsible for violating agreed upon standards of professional ethics.").
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role.202 There is similarly no consensus about whether lawyers are and ought to
be gatekeepers, either in tax law 2 03 or more generally.204 This ambivalence and
the fact that the Model Rules "neither require a lawyer to fulfill a gatekeeper role,
nor do they permit a lawyer to engage in the reporting that [a broadly conceived
gatekeeping] role could entail" explain the voluntariness of the guidelines for
lawyers in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing.205 Similarly,
mandatory gatekeeping responsibilities ought not to be required for lawyers
responding to referral requests.
Lawyers should, however, consider voluntarily embracing slightly height-
ened responsibility for compliance, using the framework advanced herein. Part
of the theory behind lawyers as (even voluntary) gatekeepers is "that the law-
yer has the capacity to monitor and to control, or at least to influence, the con-
duct of his or her clients and prospective clients in order to deter
wrongdoing." 2 06 The referral context provides such an opportunity: when
responding to a referral request, the lawyer can make it more difficult for a pro-
spective client to pursue limit-pushing or law-breaking aspirations. Moreover,
while research demonstrates that lawyers may have difficulty being effective
gatekeepers due to cognitive biases, including lawyers' identification with their
clients,2 07 the referral context, in which the lawyer is declining to represent a
client and thus has already distanced himself from that client, may pose fewer
challenges. This means that the referral decision may present an opportunity
for lawyers to discharge gatekeeping responsibilities effectively if they want to
serve in that capacity.
Even though this article's recommendations are voluntary, some will think
this article goes too far, putting too many burdens on referring lawyers, par-
ticularly when they are making decisions based on relatively little informa-
tion and do not really know what a client will do or what another lawyer will
advise. Others may think that this article's recommendations do not go far
enough, leaving too much to the lawyer's discretion and allowing lawyers to
weasel out of standing up to potential law-breakers. Perhaps at some point,
the rules governing professional conduct of lawyers ought to formally
202. See supra Part III.B.; Painter, supra note 10, at 558. It is fairly clear that, in the vast majority of situa-
tions, the moral culpability of a referring lawyer is unlikely to merit criminal punishment as an accomplice to
whatever actions the client ultimately takes. See supra Part III.D. Thus, no changes to the criminal penalties are
likely warranted at least based on the considerations discussed herein.
203. See, e.g., Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer's Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 688, 693 (1997);
Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOuISvILLE L. REV. 185 (2010); Richard Lavoie,
Am I My Brother's Keeper? A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations
and Zealous Advocacy in the Legal Profession, 44 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 813 (2013).
204. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2006); Campbell & Gaetke, supra note 114; Kraakman, supra note 114; Zacharais, supra note 114.
205. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 463, at 2 (2013).
206. Id. at 1.
207. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 110-11 (1993).
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incorporate some or all of the recommendations herein. 208 But the divergence of
likely responses to this article's recommendations 20 9 is yet another reason this article
stakes out a middle ground that urges lawyers to take more responsibility and gives
them a framework to help them do so but leaves to their discretion whether and how
to use that framework. Ultimately, in this article that is the first to identify the mere
referral decision as so morally fraught, it is enough to provide lawyers with tools for
more morally defensible decision-making.
3. INCREASING COMPLIANCE (PERHAPS) BUT LIMITING ACCESS TO THE LAW
Lawyers who adopt this article's recommendations may make fewer referrals for
potential law-breakers or may make referrals to more conservative lawyers who are
unlikely to assist in the pursuit of legally questionable goals. This may have the salu-
tary effect of increasing compliance, but this also restricts access to the law. Access
to the law is often regarded as a social good that advances client autonomy,210 and
the Preamble to the Model Rules encourages lawyers to "seek improvement of ...
access to the legal system." 2 1  However, the Preamble's references to improving
access to justice focus primarily on "those who because of economic or social bar-
riers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel." 2 12 A client seeking assistance
with potential law-breaking is unlikely to be such a person. Indeed, declining to pro-
vide a referral to a client seeking assistance with objectives that are very legally
questionable could advance other goals of the Model Rules because the lawyer may
avoid assisting, even indirectly, a client in behavior that is likely to be criminal or
fraudulent. 213
Reducing access to the law through fewer referrals is more troubling for matters
that are clearly legal but that the lawyer finds morally repugnant. A lawyer should con-
sider this concern when deciding whether to provide a referral for a matter that he has
declined for purely moral reasons. Yet, a referral is not the sine qua non of a client's
ability to continue pursuing its goals. Even if one lawyer declines the legal but morally
questionable matter and declines to provide a referral, the client is likely to be able to
use other resources to find lawyers who may see a business opportunity in representing
clients in matters that are clearly legal even if morally questionable. 214
208. The best candidate for a mandatory rule is the recommendation that lawyers not provide referrals in
mandatory declination/withdrawal situations. See supra Part IV.A. To argue for mandatory changes to referral
practices, however, proponents would have to make a case that is not focused primarily on moral culpability.
209. When presenting a version of this project, I received both comments: that the recommendations go too
far and not far enough. Although I have revised the recommendations in response to that feedback, I suspect
that the comments would remain.
210. See, e.g., Pepper, Amoral, supra note 10, at 616-17.
211. MODEL RULES pmbl ¶ 6.
212. Id.
213. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(d).
214. See Wendel, Client Selection, supra note 11, at 1015 ("As a practical matter, very few clients will find
themselves truly foreclosed from obtaining access to their legal entitlements because of morally motivated
refusals by lawyers to represent them.").
2018] 121
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
4. IMPOSING ADDITIONAL COSTS, WHILE CREATING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS
This article's recommendations admittedly impose additional costs on the re-
ferring lawyer. 215 The lawyer will spend more uncompensated time and effort
considering the referral decision. The lawyer may do more work to ascertain
additional information to make a more thoughtful decision. When doing so, the
lawyer may learn confidential information, which could create future conflicts. 2 16
The lawyer may upset clients or other professional connections if he declines to
make a referral, and this may reduce the likelihood that those connections will
refer future work to him, which could affect his business and livelihood.
But these costs also yield benefits. In addition to the benefits discussed above,
undertaking additional analysis of the referral decision demonstrates a good faith
effort to avoid facilitating law-breaking, which could assist the lawyer in case of
more aggressive enforcement strategies against, or revised rules applicable to,
lawyers. By helping the referring lawyer identify trustworthy (and well-insured)
other lawyers and by ensuring that the law-breaking risk is relatively low, the re-
ferring lawyer reduces his exposure if he inadvertently remains more involved in
the matter than he anticipated. By gathering information that enables him to avoid
providing referrals to the most aggressive other lawyers and for the most aggres-
sive clients/matters, he also reduces the risk of any adverse reputational impact
were he to be publicly revealed as connected to such lawyers and matters.
I contend that the benefits outweigh the costs, but each lawyer must judge for
himself. And if the cost of the additional analysis is too high, the lawyer can skip
the analysis recommended herein and just opt not to provide the referral. That
imposes costs on the client-diminished access to legal services and the cost of
having to, without assistance, identify counsel to help with limit-pushing or
breaking. But, as discussed above, it is not necessarily a bad thing to make it a lit-
tle harder for a potential law-breaker to find counsel.
CONCLUSION
Referrals connect clients with lawyers who help clients access the law to
achieve their goals. But referrals also yoke the referring lawyer to the client's
(possibly illicit) objectives. Thus, lawyers, particularly when dealing with aspir-
ing limit-pushers or aspiring law-breakers, should be wary of offering referrals
blithely and purely as a matter of course after declining or withdrawing from a
matter. Instead, lawyers should provide more thoughtful, more morally defensible
responses to referral requests and should take more personal responsibility for the
consequences of referrals they provide. This article explains how.
215. See Temkin, supra note 16, at 674-75.
216. See MODEL RULES R. 1.18.
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